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VALUABLE LIES
Ariel Porat & Omri Yadlin

Should a Muslim employee who falsely stated in his job interview that he is
Christian in order to avoid discrimination be fired for his dishonesty?
Should a buyer of a tract of land who conducted an expensive investigation
before contracting that revealed a high likelihood of mineral deposits be
subject to liability for fraud because he told the seller he knew nothing
about the land's mineral potential before purchase? Is a doctor violating
her legal duties toward her patient if she convinces him to get vaccinated
on the pretext that it is in his best interest when it is instead in the public
interest? In all of these cases, and many others, parties are allowed not to
disclose material information to an interested party but not to lie about the
same information.
This article makes the argument that in many contexts, where nondisclosure is permitted lies should also be tolerated, for otherwise the
social goals sought by allowing non-disclosure are frustrated. With this as
its starting point, the article develops a theory of valuable lies, discussing
the conditions under which lies should be permitted. It analyzes the main
impediments to allowing lies, the most important of which being the risk
that permitting lies would impair truth-tellers' ability to reliably convey
truthful information. The article applies the theory to various fields,
including contract law, tort law, medical malpractice, criminal law and
procedure, and constitutional law. It concludes by proposing changes to
the law that will allow telling valuable lies in well-defined categories of
cases.
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INTRODUCTION
John, a Muslim lawyer, applies for a position at a law firm. During his
job interview, he is asked about his religion and falsely states that he is
Christian. The firm hires him. A few weeks later, John's lie is discovered,
and he is fired. The firm claims that he was fired not due to his religion but
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because of his dishonesty. Assume that under prevailing law, terminating
an employment contract is allowed for just cause only. Did the firm act
legally, then?
The purpose of this article is to explore the law's approach to lying in
various fields and develop a theory of valuable lies. The theoretical
framework we propose explains why, under certain conditions, the law
tolerates lies. More importantly, we suggest that lying should be more
broadly permissible than is currently the case under the law.
Much has been written about the duty to disclose information:
contractual parties must disclose material information to each other before
contracting; doctors must disclose information about the risks of treatment
they administer to their patients; witnesses must disclose information when
testifying in court; merchants must disclose information about their
products to consumers; and firms must disclose material information about
their business to investors. Disclosure, however, is not always required. In
many circumstances, the law allows individuals, as well as firms, to
withhold information even when non-disclosure might adversely affect
other people's interests. In contrast, a right to lie has been almost
completely rejected in the case law,1 and this is rarely questioned by legal
scholars. Even where non-disclosure is allowed, lying is prohibited. We
contend that this legal equilibrium is puzzling for two reasons. First, in
many cases, the harm that non-disclosure inflicts on other parties is the
same as the harm caused by an affirmative lie. Second, in many instances,
the right not to disclose information is almost meaningless if not
accompanied by a right to lie. Thus, to return to the example we opened
with, if John is permitted by law not to disclose his religion to his potential
employer—in order to avoid illegal discrimination—recognizing his right
to lie if explicitly asked about his religion seems inevitable.
We begin the article by identifying four categories of cases in which
lies, even if harmful to some individuals, could be beneficial to society at
large. After presenting these categories, we outline our proposed theory for
determining which lies are socially valuable and which are not. The first
category of cases, involving "productive-information" lies, refers to
instances in which lying is necessary for generating productive
information. A classic example, which is extensively discussed in the
literature on disclosure duties, is that of a potential buyer of a tract of land
who conducts an expensive investigation into the likelihood of mineral
deposits on the land and discovers the chances to be high. He does not
disclose this information to the seller and buys the land for a price that does
not reflect the high likelihood of mineral deposits. The question that arises
here is whether the buyer breached a duty of disclosure toward the seller
1

For exceptional cases, see Saul Levmore, A Theory of Deception, and Then of Common
Law Categories, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1359 (2007) (presenting a few exceptional cases where
courts have tolerated deception and arguing that in these cases, deception can be justified by
cost-benefit rationale).
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and whether the latter is entitled to rescind the contract. The answer
commonly given to this question in the legal literature is that subjecting
such a buyer to a duty to disclose the results of his investigation would
discourage him from conducting such an investigation to begin with,
because he would not be able to reap its benefits. More important, however,
is that his investigation generates information that is socially beneficial or
productive, for it can facilitate the efficient use of the land and increase
social welfare. Therefore, to encourage the buyer to initiate such an
investigation, he should be allowed to withhold its results from the seller.2
But suppose that the seller in our example explicitly asks the buyer
whether he investigated the chances of finding mineral deposits on the land
and what emerged from this investigation: How should the buyer be
required to respond? If we take the social value of generating productive
information argument seriously, then the unavoidable conclusion is that the
buyer should be permitted to either falsely deny conducting an
investigation or else lie about its results, for again, otherwise, he would
never invest in acquiring the information to begin with. Note that
restricting the buyer to a "no comment" response would not be of any avail
to the buyer, because the seller would likely interpret such a response as
indicative of a high likelihood of mineral deposits, and the buyer would
still be deprived of the profits of his acquired information. Moreover,
sometimes the mere knowledge that the buyer is a mineral mining expert
could signal to the seller that there are good chances of finding minerals on
her land. In such a case, the buyer's only option for profiting from his
information is to conceal his identity and, if necessary, lie about it.
Yet in contrast to our proposed understanding of the need to allow
lying in such contexts, the law imposes an outright prohibition on lies in
commercial negotiations. As a result, if the buyer in our example were to
lie about either the likelihood of mineral deposits on the land or his
identity, the seller would be entitled to rescind the contract and even
recover her losses.3 We argue that the law's stance on lying is both
inefficient and inconsistent. We suggest several innovative solutions to this
paradigmatic case, which, if adopted, would restore both efficiency and
consistency in the law.
The second category of cases we identify involves "anti-abuse" lies.
Consider again the example of John the Muslim lawyer. It is universally
accepted that an employee is not under any legal duty to disclose his or her

2

Anthony Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978) (arguing that when information is deliberately acquired by a buyer,
there should be no duty of disclosure). For the prevailing contract law approach on this
matter, see infra note 27 and accompanying text.
3
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981) (in order to make a contract
voidable, the party's manifestation of assent must be induced by the other party's
misrepresentation that is either fraudulent or material); ALAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
252-54 (4th ed. 2004) (same).
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religion, sexual orientation, race, or any other personal characteristics that
are irrelevant to the employment, even if (and, even more, especially if) his
or her employer is interested in this information. But what if the only way
to keep these personal details private is to lie about them? Should lying in
order to avoid the risk of discrimination be tolerated by the law? Our claim
is that the only way to take religion (and like attributes) off the employment
table is to allow employees or potential employees to lie about it.
But how far should the law go in order to prevent potential
discrimination? For example, should the law allow an employee to give a
false name since his true name reveals he is a Muslim? The more general
question is whether lying can be justified when the liar's goal is to conceal
information from someone in order to prevent the latter from abusing other
people's rights and when non-disclosure is clearly allowed by the law.
Interestingly, the law is not always clear as to the extent to which antiabuse lies are permissible. While a few courts have been sympathetic to
lying in the context of employment discrimination, others have ruled
against employees in such circumstances.4 In other contexts, the law has
taken an even less sympathetic approach to anti-abuse lies. For example,
the Fifth Amendment, as interpreted by the courts, allows defendants,
suspects and witnesses to remain silent in order to avoid self-incrimination,
but does not permit lying for the same purpose, even when the police or
prosecution abuse their interrogational powers by forcing the interrogee to
incriminate himself.5 Similarly but in a different context, doctors who
administer vaccinations to their patients are not required to inform them
that it is in their best interest not to be vaccinated and instead free-ride on
(in other words, abuse) others who do get vaccinated but they are strictly
prohibited by law to lie to their patients in order to convince them to get
vaccinated.6 We challenge this stance on anti-abuse lies, claiming that in
certain well-defined set of cases, they should be tolerated.
The third category of cases—which involves what we call "truthrevealing lies"—is when a lie is told to generate the truth. Examples of
truth-revealing lying are cases in which the police lie during a criminal
interrogation and attorneys lie in cross-examining witnesses.7 In these
contexts, the lies are aimed at extracting valuable information from
someone who is trying to conceal that information. Another example is a
lie disseminated by a victim of defamation aimed at undermining his
defamer's credibility.8 In such cases, the victim's defensive lie is intended
to cast doubt on the reliability of the false information spread by the
defamer and thereby generate truth. In all such instances, the lies are
instrumental to uncovering the truth; yet, while in some contexts, the law
4

Infra Part II.A.1.
Infra Part II.A.2.
6
Infra Part II.A.3.
7
Infra Part III.A.1.
8
Infra Part III.A.2.
5
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permits truth-revealing lies, they are prohibited in the majority of cases. We
submit that this type of lie should be tolerated by the law in a broader range
of situations.
The fourth and final category is cases of paternalistic lies, which most
typically arise in the context of the doctor-patient relationship. One
example of such a case is the doctor who lies to her patient about his
medical condition so as to reduce his stress and anxiety or spare him
despair and distress in a hopeless situation.9 Such lies can often have a
therapeutic effect, in that they can increase a patient's chances of recovery.
Another example of paternalistic lying is when a doctor lies to her patient
in order to persuade him to undergo a medical procedure that is clearly in
the patient's best interests, but he refuses the treatment for irrational
reasons.10 In this gray zone, non-disclosure—but not lies—are often
tolerated by the law. We argue that sometimes even lies should be
permitted in this context, especially when essential for a patient's
recovery.11 Indeed, although it is usually the patient who decides on his or
her medical treatment, there might be exceptional circumstances that
warrant other solutions.
The four categories of cases we discuss do not exhaust all types of lies
that either are or should be tolerated by the law. The justification for some
cases of lying is self-evident and warrants no further discussion. For
example, the potential victim of a crime is more than encouraged to lie—
often even encouraged to act violently—toward an actual or potential
aggressor in self-defense. For the purposes of the present article, these are
not "interesting" cases, not only because the benefits of lying
overwhelmingly exceed the harms, but also since such lies impose no any
negative effects on third parties nor generate any harm to societal
interests.12 Indeed, what characterizes all cases in the four categories
presented above are the possible effects of lying, both negative and
positive, on others, beyond the liar and the person lied to. We maintain that
these external effects are crucial in determining when lying should be
permitted by the law. Understanding these effects is fundamental to our
theory of valuable lies.
Indeed, we assert that valuable lies—i.e., those that the law should
tolerate—must be in the service of at least one social goal. The types of lies
in our four categories of cases meet this condition: productive-information
lies create important incentives to generate productive information; antiabuse lies decrease the likelihood of the harmful abuse of people's rights;

9

Infra Part IV.A.1.
Infra Part IV.A.2.
11
Id.
12
Theoretically, there could, nonetheless, be some third-party effects: if victims of crime are
allowed to lie, criminals will never believe them and might inflict, in certain cases, more
harm on them. Such an argument, however, is highly speculative and strong counterarguments easily come to mind.
10
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truth-revealing lies seek to uncover the truth; and paternalistic lies benefit
the people to whom the lie is told. This condition albeit necessary for
determining whether a lie is socially valuable and should be permitted, is
not the sole consideration. There are two further considerations to be taken
into account in evaluating the social desirability of a lie.
The first consideration is whether allowing lying in a given case could
dilute the truth-signal of non-liars, thereby adversely affecting truth-tellers
as well as those to whom they convey information. This can be illustrated
with the example of the buyer who discovered a high probability of mineral
deposits on the land he is considering purchasing: if it is permissible for
him to lie, potential buyers of other tracts of land, who discover a low
likelihood of finding minerals, might have difficulty conveying this
negative information to the sellers. The reason is obvious: if lying in such
circumstances is permitted, both buyers with positive information and
buyers with negative information about the pieces of land they are
considering purchasing will tell the respective sellers that they have
negative information about the land, and sellers might therefore be unable
to distinguish between truth-tellers and liars. Consequently, some efficient
transactions between truth-telling buyers and sellers will be prevented.
The second consideration is whether lying would be ineffective in
achieving its social goal because the deceived party can verify the
information and detect the lie. If such verification is a realistic option, there
is often no sense in permitting lying, since it generates no benefits and only
costs. To illustrate, let us return to the doctor who lies to her patient about
the vaccinations in fact serving the goal of protecting third parties. In this
case, the first consideration points to the undesirability of allowing lying: it
could adversely affect the credibility of truth-telling doctors, thereby
reducing the extent to which vaccinations are taken by patients, even when
a particular vaccination is in a patient’s best interests. Moreover, a rule
permitting lying in this context would lead some patients to seek a second
opinion or information from other sources, such as medical books, which
they may regard as more trustworthy. Many of these patients would
eventually refuse vaccination if it does not serve their self-interest, and the
social goal of lying would be frustrated. Assuming many patients would
behave like this, permitting a doctor to lie here would be ineffective: it
would only add verification costs and produce no benefits. Ironically, this
effectivity consideration gains force, against allowing lying, the more
sophisticated the patients; the less sophisticated a patient, the more he or
she will mistakenly believe the doctor's advice, and the more successful
lying will be in achieving its goal.
The article proceeds as follows. In Part I, we lay out our theory of
valuable lies, based on the considerations for and against permitting lying,
and apply it to cases of productive-information lies. We focus on this type
of lie in our analysis because the duty to disclose the information that it
generates has received the greatest amount of attention in the legal
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literature, yet the question whether the law should recognize a right to lie
about the contents of such information has been almost completely ignored.
Parts II, III, and IV apply our theory to anti-abuse lies, truth-revealing lies,
and paternalistic lies, respectively. Each part offers an account of the law's
stance on the relevant category of lies and then considers an alternative
understanding and approach based on our theory of valuable lies. Our
analysis provides a normative basis for evaluating the law's treatment of
lying in all legal fields. The Conclusion wraps-up the discussion and
summarizes our proposals for changes to the law to allow for valuable lies
in certain circumstances and contexts.

I. A THEORY OF VALUABLE LIES AND PRODUCTIVE INFORMATION
A. In General
A recurring question in many legal fields is whether one person has a
duty to reveal information to another. Most notably, in contractual contexts,
courts are often called upon to delineate the scope of the duty of disclosure
between parties negotiating a contract. On the one hand, more disclosure
increases the chances of the parties' decisions to enter into the contract and
the contract itself being efficient. On the other hand, it is often argued that
the contractual parties are entitled to reap the benefits of information they
possess and, therefore, should not be required to share it with the other
party.
While the case-law is divided over the question of the scope of the
duty of disclosure, there is near-consensus that lies in negotiations are
impermissible.13 The same distinction between a failure to reveal
information (omission) and lies (commission) is made in other areas of the
law as well. In criminal proceedings, defendants, suspects, and witnesses
are all entitled to refrain from answering questions if it could incriminate
them, whereas lying to avoid similar self-incrimination is not permitted.14
In employment law, job applicants are not required to disclose personal
details that are not relevant to performing the job they are applying for, but
lying about those same details could be subject to legal sanctions.15
Another example is the law's tolerance of a doctor's failure to disclose full
information to her patient in order to protect him from his own irrational
choices or spare him anguish and despair, whereas straightforward lies—
regardless of how paternalistic—are commonly prohibited.16
Why does the law's approach to lying differ so considerably from its

13

Infra text accompanying notes 27-28.
Infra Part II.A.2.
15
Infra Part II.A.1.
16
Infra Part IV.A.1.
14
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treatment of a failure to reveal information? One reason is anchored in
deontological morality: lies are considered immoral per se, whereas the
failure to reveal information is not. Moreover, lying is commission,
whereas a failure to reveal information is omission, and this distinction
matters for deontological morality.17 Another explanation is
consequentialist or, more specifically, welfarist in nature: permitting lies
can dilute the truth-signal of non-liars, namely, truth-tellers will find it
harder, at times impossible, to distinguish themselves from liars. This could
adversely affect both truth-tellers and those to whom they convey
information.
The concern over diluting the truth-signal is a key factor in the almostgeneral prohibition of lying, as well as its exceptions, under prevailing law.
This concern is a serious consideration when determining whether a new
exception to the prohibition should be recognized. Moreover, there seems
to be a correlation between this concern and the remedy, or sanction,
imposed on liars: the harsher the sanction on lying, the stronger the truthsignal of parties who choose not to lie, but at the same time, the lower the
chances that the lie will be told and achieve its social goal. Thus, even in
cases where the law prohibits lying, it may still impose intermediate
remedies to balance out the benefits of lying and the costs of diluting the
truth-signal.18
The goal of this article is to propose a theory of valuable lies,
comprised of three stages. To make a prima-facie case for permitting a lie
in any given context, it is necessary to first identify the value generated by
the lie in question beyond its value to the liar. If such a value is determined,
it should be compared to the costs generated by the dilution of the truthsignal sent by non-liars. The third stage of our theory is the consideration
of whether lying would, in fact, be effective in achieving the goal for which
it should arguably be permitted. If lying emerges to be ineffective in this
respect, then there is no reason to permit it, but rather quite the contrary:
prohibiting lying would save the costs of distinguishing between liars and
truth-tellers that other parties would be forced to incur.
In the discussion in the following sections, we elaborate on these three
components of our theory, applied to productive-information lies.
B. Productive Information Lies
In our theory, the first step to recognizing a right to tell lies in any of
the four categories of cases is to identify a social value in lying in the
particular context and ensure that this value cannot be reasonably attained
without lying. Consider the following example:
17

EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS, AND MORALITY 282-83 (2010)
(describing and criticizing the law's rigid distinction between deception by commission and
deception by omission).
18
Infra Part I.B.3.
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Example 1. Mineral Deposits. After conducting an expensive and
thorough investigation, which has indicated a high likelihood of
finding minerals on a specific tract of land, Buyer makes an offer
to Seller to purchase the land. Seller asks Buyer if he has any
information regarding the likelihood of mineral deposits on the
land, and Buyer responds that he has no such information. Seller
accepts Buyer's offer. Once she discovers Buyer's lie, however, she
seeks to rescind the contract. Is she entitled to do so?19
1. Types of Information
Before discussing the question of whether lying in the above example
should be permitted, two distinctions must be made: the first, between
"deliberately acquired information" and "casually acquired information"
and, the second, between “productive information” and “redistributive
information.” As we will show below, with deliberately acquired
productive information, lying could generate social value.
The first distinction was originally proposed by Anthony Kronman
over thirty years ago. According to Kronman,
the term "deliberately acquired information" means
information whose acquisition entails costs which would
not have been incurred but for the likelihood, however
great, that the information in question would actually be
produced… If the costs incurred in acquiring the
information… would have been incurred in any case—that
is whether or not the information was forthcoming—the
information may be said to have been casually acquired.20
Kronman asserted that in negotiating a contract, there should be a duty
to disclose only casually acquired information and not deliberately acquired
information.21 Our example, where information was deliberately acquired,
can clarify why: Buyer's investigation into the likelihood of finding
minerals was deliberate and expensive, and had he been duty-bound to
disclose the results of this investigation to Seller, he would have never
conducted it in the first place.22 In order to preserve Buyer's ex-ante
19

For similar cases, see Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 201 S.C. 427 (S.C. 1942) (buyer
did not disclose the existence of valuable mineral deposits on the land, which was unknown
to seller, and the court upheld buyer's behavior, emphasizing that buyer did not lie); Caples
v. Steel, 7 Ore. 491 (Ore. 1879) (same).
20
Kronman, supra note 2, at 13.
21
Id. at 33.
22
At first glance, one might think that the buyer in our example would have incentives to
conduct the investigation in order to avoid a bad deal. But in fact, if Buyer knew that he
would be required to disclose everything to Seller, assuming he were interested in buying
the land only for its potential mineral deposits, he would not be interested in the transaction
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incentives to acquire it, the law should enable him—following Kronman's
argument—to realize the benefits of this information by allowing him to
withhold it from Seller. However, were this information casually
acquired—for example, had Buyer learned about the high likelihood of
mineral deposits from a conversation he overheard, say, while riding the
bus—it should be disclosed to Seller because this would not affect the
incentive to generate valuable information.23
Note that obligating Buyer to disclose casually-acquired information
to Seller runs the risk of Buyer forgoing the transaction and keeping the
information to himself. As a result, the information would be wasted and
no use made of it, to society's detriment. This problem would be resolved
were Buyer exempt from a duty to disclose, since he would then enter into
the transaction with Seller and make use of the information he acquired.
Nonetheless, the case for non-disclosure is stronger with regard to
deliberately acquired information.
Under the second distinction, between productive and redistributive
information, a duty of disclosure is justified for the latter but not the
former.24 Information is redistributive when it transfers value from one
party to another, without creating any social value. In contrast, information
is productive when it creates social value. When information is
redistributive, any costs incurred in acquiring it are a waste; if subject to a
duty of disclosure, a buyer would have no incentive to acquire the
redistributive information in the first place, and efficiency would be
enhanced.25 To understand this, consider a variation of our mineral deposits
example, in which the information about the high likelihood of mineral
deposits is available to the public, but for some reason, the government
prohibits any mining on the land. Suppose that Buyer incurs costs
investigating the likelihood of the government permitting mining on the
land in the near future and discovers the chances of this to be high.
Although this is deliberately acquired information according to Kronman's
definition, it is merely redistributive, and therefore, Buyer should be
obliged to disclose it to Seller.
In sum, the law should encourage the generation only of productive
information, by not imposing on the party that acquires the information a
duty to disclose it to the other party. The case for non-disclosure is
especially compelling when the information is both productive and
deliberately acquired. Accordingly, in Example 1, no duty should be

to begin with, since he could not profit from it.
23
Kronman, supra note 2, at 14.
24
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 294-96 (2012) (distinguishing
between productive and redistributive information and explaining the relevance of that
distinction to disclosure law).
25
Id. at 295 (explaining that investing in redistributive information wastes resources).
Arguably, the buyer would have some incentives to make sure he does not enter into a
losing contract. But see supra note 22.

12

VALUABLE LIES

imposed on Buyer to disclose information about the high likelihood of
finding minerals on Seller's land.26
2. The Case for Lying
Under prevailing law, non-disclosure is allowed in cases represented
by Example 1.27 The prevailing rule in all legal systems, however, is that
inducing a contract by lying is fraud and the deceived party is, therefore,
entitled to rescind the contract and recover for her losses.28 Yet our claim is
that a mere right not to disclose information is not sufficient for securing
the buyer's entitlement in the productive information he deliberately
acquired, since the seller, knowing the buyer is under no duty of disclosure,
will simply ask him to reveal his information.29 As a result, buyers with no
26

This is not to say that applying a non-disclosure rule to cases of productive information
would not be cost-free: sellers who are better than buyers at mining minerals might sell their
land to buyers for a low price because they are unaware of the potential of mineral deposits
on the land. Those same buyers would then sell the land back to the previous owner, or to a
new buyer who is better at mining minerals than the original buyer, which would increase
unnecessarily transaction costs. Note, however, that if the buyer is the better searcher of
information, as we assume, a duty of disclosure could mean that neither the buyer nor the
seller would search for information, and the seller's superior ability to mine minerals would,
therefore, be meaningless.
An additional consequence of non-disclosure would be the duplicative costs of search: some
sellers, knowing they cannot trust buyers, would engage in their own search for information,
even if buyers can do it at a lower cost. This concern disappears if we assume search costs
for non-expert sellers to be prohibitively high.
27
See, e.g., Holly Hill Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 201 S.C. 427, 437-38 (S.C. 1942) ("no duty
rests upon the vendee to disclose facts which he may happen to know advantageous to the
vendor, facts concerning the thing to be sold which would enhance its value or tend to cause
the vendor to demand a higher price, and the like; so that failure to disclose would not be a
fraudulent concealment"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 161(b) cmt. d. (1981) ("In
many situations, if one party knows that the other is mistaken as to a basic assumption, he is
expected to disclose the fact that would correct the mistake, … [But a] buyer of property, for
example, is not ordinarily expected to disclose circumstances that make the property more
valuable than the seller supposes.").
28
Holly Hill Lumber Co., 201 S.C. at 440 ("[I]t is agreed that an informed vendee must limit
himself to silence in order to escape the imputation of fraud. If in addition to the party's
silence there is any statement, even in word or act on his part, which tends affirmatively to a
suppression of the truth, or to a withdrawal or distraction of the other party's attention or
observation from the real facts, the line is overstepped, and the concealment becomes
fraudulent."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 164(1) (1981) (in order to make a
contract voidable, the party's manifestation of assent must be induced by the other party's
misrepresentation that is either fraudulent or material); FARNSWORTH, supra note 3, at 25254 (same).
29
In most of the law and economics literature, fraud is considered to be inefficient. See, e.g.,
STEVEN SHAVELL, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 329-30 (2004) (arguing that
fraud is socially undesirable because efforts to carry it out and detect it are a waste and it
may also lead to inefficient transactions); COOTER & ULEN, supra note 24, at 298-99
(explaining that the economic reason for not enforcing a contract made by fraud is to save
the parties the costs of verifying material information). But see Saul Levmore, Securities
and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 139-40 (1982)
(arguing for an “optimal dishonesty” rule that would allow lies in cases analogical to
Example 1). See also Emily Sherwin, Nonmaterial Misrepresentation: Damages,
Rescission, and the Possibility of Efficient Fraud, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1017, 1023-24
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information will declare that they have no information, and buyers who
refuse to say anything (with a "no comment" response) will be exposed as
informed buyers who know the high likelihood of finding minerals on the
land for sale.
Arguably, the law could solve this problem by prohibiting sellers from
asking questions about productive information and prohibiting buyers from
disclosing productive information. This solution, however, would
encounter a serious enforcement problem: if the buyer has no such
information, he will declare that he is uninformed, knowing that the seller
lacks any incentive "to report" that the buyer has violated the prohibition
on such disclosure. As a result, only informed buyers will keep silent,
thereby signaling their status—as informed—to sellers.
If the law retains its strict prohibition on lying, then, there is no reason
not to impose a duty to disclose productive information: either way, sellers
will eventually identify informed buyers, so why not save parties
communication costs? Indeed, with or without a duty of disclosure, buyers
will lack incentive to generate productive information under a legal rule
prohibiting lying.
Alternatively, if the law recognizes the social interest in encouraging
potential buyers to generate productive information, it should also
recognize the right of such buyers to lie about the productive information
they have acquired. Sometimes lying that they have no information, even if
they have positive information, would suffice; sometimes—like when the
seller knows the buyer has acquired information—a lie regarding the
contents of the information would be necessary. Although permitting lies
would dilute the truth-signal of uninformed buyers, as we show in Section
C below, in productive information cases, there is almost no social interest
in the strength of this signal.
3. Remedies
Rather than depriving deceived sellers from a remedy against buyers
who lied to them, the law could maintain its current reluctance to tolerate
lies but, at the same time, tailor the remedy to take into account our
productivity argument.
One possible option would be to allow the seller to collect damages
that would put her in the position she would have been in had the buyer
kept silent rather than lying ("silence-based remedy"). Under this remedy, a
buyer would be allowed to retain the property he has purchased but have to
compensate the seller for the difference between the actual contractual

(2003) (arguing that low-level fraud should not result in markedly inefficient exchanges and
may even help in overcoming bargaining impasses); Michael J. Borden, Mistake and
Disclosure in a Model of Two-Sided Informational Inputs, 73 MO. L. REV. 667, 667-705
(2008) (discussing both Kronman’s and Levmore’s arguments and proposing a rule that
requires minimal truthful disclosure in response to generalized questions from sellers).
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price and what would have been the asking price had the buyer kept silent.
The rationale of this remedy is straightforward: since the buyer was entitled
to refrain from disclosing the truth by remaining silent, the seller should be
neither better-off nor worse-off than what she would have been had the
buyer remained silent.30 The difficulty with this remedy in our context,
however, is that if the buyer's silence would, indeed, have revealed the
truth, he would have to pay the seller damages in an amount equal to the
profit he made from the information he acquired. As a result, the buyer will
have no incentive to search for productive information to begin with.
Another possibility is to allow the seller to collect damages that would
put her in the position she would have been in had the buyer kept silent and
had the seller, counter-factually, not been able to derive any information
from that silence ("no-information-based remedy"). In one important
respect, the rationale for this remedy is similar to the silence-based remedy:
both are based on the buyer's entitlement to remain silent. But there is also
an important difference between them: whereas the silence-based remedy
focuses only on the buyer's entitlement to refrain from disclosing the truth
by remaining silent, the no-information-based remedy is grounded also on
the seller's disentitlement to infer any information from the buyer's silence.
This latter remedy could potentially apply to cases of productive
information, particularly if the information was deliberately acquired. Thus,
if Buyer in Example 1 were to have lied and denied having any information
about the land, damages under the no-information-based remedy would
amount to zero. If instead he were to have lied by claiming he had negative
information about the land (a low likelihood of mineral deposits), when in
fact he had positive information (a high likelihood of mineral deposits),
damages would amount to the difference between the actual contractual
price and what would have been the asking price had the seller possessed
no information about the land.
The distinction between the different remedies can be illustrated by
the landmark Supreme Court Basic v. Levinson decision.31 In this case,
Basic made public statements falsely denying rumors that it was engaged in
merger negotiations with another company. Following Basic's
announcement that it had signed a merger agreement, a class action was
brought against the company and some of its directors by Basic
shareholders who had sold their stock at what they claimed to be artificially
30

Note that according to a more extreme remedy, damages are measured by the difference
between the contractual price and the price that would have been set by the seller had the
buyer revealed the truth. Clearly, under this rule, buyers in cases represented by Example 1
would not engage in any search for productive information.
31
485 U.S. 224 (1988). The Basic decision is famous mainly for its adoption of the fraudon-the-market theory, which opened the door to class action suits against publicly held
companies that disseminate false information. Recently, twenty-five years after Basic, the
U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari to reexamine the validity of this
theory. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., f/k/a Archdiocese of Milwaukee
Supporting Fund, Inc., 2013 WL 4855972 (2013).
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depressed prices due to the misleading statements about the negotiations.
The Court acknowledged the social interest in encouraging firms to
engage in a search for information about potential merger transaction and,
therefore, ruled that Basic had not been under any duty to disclose its
involvement in merger negotiations. Hence, it held, Basic was entitled to
give a “no comment” response to analysts and journalists inquiring about
rumors of such negotiations. However, the Court also held that once Basic
had decided to speak on the matter, it became subject to a duty to tell the
truth and was not allowed to falsely deny the rumors.32
The Basic decision did not clarify how damages should be measured
in such a class action. The most commonly applied remedy in a fraud case
of this type is the “out of pocket” measure of damages, which would entitle
the Basic plaintiffs to the difference between the price at which they sold
their stock and the hypothetical market price of the stock had Basic told the
truth about the merger negotiations.33 Under the no-information-based
remedy, in contrast, which recognizes Basic's right to keep silent (instead
of revealing the truth), the plaintiffs would be awarded only the difference
between the price at which they sold their stock and its hypothetical market
price had Basic given a "no comment" response to inquiries about the
merger negotiations and had the public inferred no information from that
response. Accordingly, the Basic plaintiffs would be entitled to no more
than the difference between the price at which they sold their stock and the
hypothetical market price of that stock had the public known nothing about
the merger negotiations.
The advantage of the no-information-based remedy is that, on the one
hand, it prohibits all forms of lying, yet on the other hand, it incorporates
the social interest in encouraging generation of productive information.
C. Dilution of the Truth-Signal
In evaluating the desirability of allowing lies in each of the categories
of cases discussed in this article, it is not sufficient to look simply at the
social value created by lying in these situations, but rather, the harms
caused by permitting these lies must also be weighed. The dilution of the
truth-signal is the main harm that should be considered in this context;
32

For a critique of this decision, see Jonathan Macey & Geoffrey Miller, Good Finance,
Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the Market Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1059,
1091 (1990) (arguing that "management should be allowed to deny rumors which it knows
to be correct and even to make affirmative misstatements if doing so is necessary to protect
aggregate share value", and explaining that in this kind of cases, the old fashioned "no
comment" response is not sufficient). See also Ian Ayres, Back to Basics: Regulating How
Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REV. 945, 948-50 (1991) (arguing that
corporations should be allowed to lie in some cases, such as Basic, and suggesting to
establish a default rule which permits lying, while allowing the parties to contract around it).
33
See e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on
the Market, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 69, 84-93 (2011) (explaining in detail how out-of-pocket
damages are calculated in fraud-on-the-market cases).
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indeed, broad permission to lie would adversely affect both truth-tellers and
the parties transacting with them.
It is for this reason that lies should be allowed in a narrow and welldefined set of cases, where even if the permission to lie dilutes the truthsignal, the harm will be more than offset by the social value generated by
the lies. In this section, we analyze the effect of permitting productiveinformation lies on the truth–signal.
Consider again Example 1, and assume that Buyer is allowed to lie in
order to conceal from Seller the information he acquired about the potential
for mineral deposits on Seller's land. Presumably, this would affect
potential buyers who lack information about the particular tract of land they
are seeking to buy or else know the chances of finding minerals to be low.
These buyers, the argument goes, would not be able to reliably convey their
ignorance or negative information to sellers. Consequently, the parties
might fail to reach an agreement, and an efficient transaction would be
prevented.
To assess this concern, we will distinguish between two legal regimes:
Under Regime A, an informed Buyer is permitted to lie and deny he has any
information about the land's mining potential. Under Regime B, an
informed Buyer is permitted to lie and say that there is a low potential for
finding mineral deposits on the land, even though he knows that potential
to be high.
We will begin with Regime A. Two possible groups of truth-tellers can
be imagined in our context: the one comprising professionals who have
investigated the land's potential and learned that the chances of finding
minerals there are low, and the second, comprising potential buyers who
have not investigated the land's potential, since their expertise and the costs
of such an investigation make it inefficient for them to do so. The members
of the first group would likely never become the buyers in our context.
Professionals typically buy land where the likelihood of mineral deposits is
higher than expected by the general public. Thus, if they learn that the
chances of finding minerals on the land for sale are lower than expected by
the general public, they will likely refrain from purchasing the land.
Furthermore, if they can reliably convey the negative information to the
owner of the land, the latter will prefer selling the land to uninformed
buyers.34 More importantly, even if these professional buyers wanted to
buy the land, they would be able to reliably convey the negative
information to the seller because in Regime A, they are not allowed to lie
about the contents of their information; they are only allowed to falsely
deny that they are in possession of such information.
The second group of buyers, for their part, would be interested in
buying the land for purposes other than mining minerals. To purchase the
34

Unless this information is available to other potential buyers, the seller would not be able
to sell the land for its original price before the investigation takes place.
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land, they would be required to pay a price that reflects a certain
probability that they have positive information about the land that they are
withholding from the seller. As a result, sellers would demand a higher
price for their land, and many buyers might forego efficient transactions.
Note, however, that the higher price that sellers would demand would
reflect the fact that under Regime A, compared to a regime of full
disclosure, there is a higher probability that professionals will search for
and find minerals on the land. Under Regime A, therefore, the value of the
land is, indeed, higher than under a full–disclosure regime. The fact that
sellers and buyers would not be able to reach an agreement on price does
not necessarily imply, then, that Regime A frustrates efficient transactions.
Regime B is a bit trickier. Under this regime, buyers who investigated
the likelihood of mineral deposits on the land are not only permitted to
deny that they made such an investigation but are also allowed to lie and
state to the seller that their investigation showed there to be a low
likelihood of mineral deposits. Such a lie could be required if the seller
learned about the buyer's investigation and explicitly asked him about its
results. If such a lie were permitted, it would adversely affect truth-tellers
who conducted investigations on the land and discovered a low likelihood
of finding minerals. Under a rule prohibiting lies, these buyers would
successfully convey the information they acquired to the seller and pay a
price discounted to reflect the low chances of mineral deposits. Under
Regime B, however, these truth-telling buyers would not receive such a
discount, because the seller would not believe them. Note, however, that
with professional buyers, as we explained earlier, no problem would arise,
since if they find out that the chances of finding minerals on the land are
low (i.e., lower than the chances predicted by the publicly available
information), they will likely search for a different piece of land to
purchase. And as under Regime A, in Regime B as well, a non-professional
buyer who did not investigate the land's potential would have to pay an
inflated price for the land: the seller would assume a certain probability of
the buyer's having conducted an investigation and discovering a likelihood
of mineral deposits on the land and to be withholding that positive
information from her, the seller.
In sum, lying in productive information cases represented by Example
1 will dilute the truth-signal of truth-telling buyers. This would have
practically no effect on professional buyers. It would, however, impact
non-professional buyers, but only when sellers suspect them of withholding
information about the land that they in fact do not have.
D. Effectiveness and Costs of Defense
Another consideration against a rule allowing socially valuable lies is
that lying is often ineffective in achieving its intended (valuable) goals.
Specifically, the "deceived" party, knowing that she cannot trust the liar's
words, could take costly measures to verify the information provided to her
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by the liar and detect the lie. Similarly, truth-tellers could take costly steps
to distinguish themselves as truth-tellers, indirectly enabling other parties
to detect liars. If this is all likely to occur, there is no sense in permitting
lies: first, many lies will often fail to attain their desirable goals; second,
parties will often incur costs to detect lies, to distinguish between liars and
truth-tellers, and to acquire information that has already been acquired by
the other party to the transaction.
How does this consideration apply to Example 1? Arguably, if Seller
knows that Buyer is allowed to lie either about the potential of mineral
deposits on the land or with regard to his identity as a mineral mining
expert, she might incur costs to make sure she does not sell valuable land at
too low a price. This scenario, however, is a very unlikely one: Seller in
this example is not a professional searching for information about mineral
potential, and most likely her costs to investigate her land's potential would
exceed the expected benefit of acquiring that information. Therefore, lies in
cases represented by Example 1 can be expected to be effective in realizing
their goal and not to entail excessive costs of defense.
II. ANTI-ABUSE LIES
This Part of the article now turns to develop the notion that there are
situations in which people should be allowed to lie in order to avoid or
prevent the abuse of their own rights or those of others. Our example of
John the Muslim lawyer, which opened this article, is representative of one
type of cases in which anti-abuse lies are told. In John's case, he lied so as
to avoid the risk of being discriminated against on the basis of his religion.
Should such a lie be permitted by the law? Another case of anti-abuse lying
arises in the criminal law context: defendants, suspects, and witnesses are
all entitled to remain silent when at risk of self-incrimination. Should they
be allowed also to lie in order to avoid this risk? A third context is cases in
which lies are told to protect the rights of third parties from abuse by
others. Our paradigmatic example of such situations is the doctor who tells
her patient that a certain vaccine serves his best interest, when in fact it is
for the protection of others (just as vaccinating others protects this patient).
In all of these cases, we examine arguments for and against a tolerant
approach to lying.
A. The Prima-Facie Case and the Law
1. Discrimination
The prima-facie case for permitting lies is easy to ground in cases
represented by the example of John the Muslim lawyer: lying about
religion, race, gender, or other personal characteristics that are irrelevant to
employment is the most effective mechanism for minorities to avoid illegal
discrimination. Moreover, it causes no harm to non-discriminating
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employers and employees.
There appears to be no straightforward instance in the case-law of an
employee who lied about his or her religion, race, or gender and was later
fired due to that lie. The courts have, however, addressed in many instances
the matter of whether an employee's misrepresentation of his or her
credentials or qualifications or work history when applying for the job
constitutes legal cause for firing him or her. This issue can arise under both
just cause and at will rules. Under a just cause rule, the question is whether
the misrepresentation amounts to just cause for terminating the
employment contract;35 under an at-will rule, the question is whether the
termination is legal because of the misrepresentation, even if it was
motivated by illegal discrimination36 (or other unlawful reasons37). This can
be relevant to two types of cases. The one is when an employer finds out
about an employee's misrepresentation and this triggers the termination of
the employment.38 The second type of case is when an employer terminates
the employment for reasons unrelated to any misrepresentation, but in the
course of preparing its response to the employee's wrongful dismissal
claims, uncovers the latter's misrepresentation.39
In Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., the plaintiff
argued that in firing her, the employer had violated Michigan's antidiscrimination law and that this was therefore wrongful discharge.40 The
35

Even if misrepresentation is generally considered just cause for termination, it might be
deemed unjust if applied by the employer in a discriminatory manner. See Enter. Wire Co.
v. Enter. Indep. Union, 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 359 (1966) (presenting seven tests for
determining just cause for termination, including the test of equal treatment: the employer
has to apply all rules, orders, and penalties evenhandedly and without discrimination to all
employees).
36
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973) (holding that in an
employment discrimination suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 1964, a plaintiff
"must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence that the
presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially
discriminatory decision"). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits wrongful discharge
based upon race, religion, gender, age, or national origin.
37
See Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, 124
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3 (2001) (discussing unlawful reasons for firing employees under the
employment-at-will rule).
38
Lavat v. Fruin Colnon Corp., 232 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1027 (Ill. App. 1992) (upholding the
employer's decision to fire an employee upon discovery that he had falsified his education
information).
39
Some courts have held that such misrepresentations can serve as the basis for dismissing
the employee. See, e.g., Oak Lawn v. Human Rights Com., 133 Ill. App. 3d 221, 225 (Ill.
App. 1985) (holding that a potential employee's misrepresentation, which was discovered by
the employer only after he refused to hire her and a discrimination charge was filed, can
serve as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to employ her); Leahey v. Fed.
Express Corp., 685 F. Supp. 127, 128 (D.C. E. Va. 1988) ("just cause for termination may
include facts and circumstances not known to the employer"). Other courts have taken the
opposite view, see, e.g., Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369 (7th
Cir. 1993) ("A discriminatory firing must be decided solely with respect to the known
circumstances leading to the discharge ... , The after discovered alternate reason comes too
late.").
40
955 F.2d 409 (6th Cir. 1992).
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defendant employer, in turn, argued that the plaintiff had been dismissed
due to her unsatisfactory work performance; moreover, it was claimed, she
had lied on her employment application eight years earlier in falsely stating
that she had a college degree and exaggerating her prior work experience.41
The appellate court held that not all misrepresentations qualify as just cause
for terminating the employment, and to do so, the following criteria must
be met: the false information must have been material; it must have related
directly to the measuring of the candidate for employment; and the
employer must have relied on the false information in making its hiring
decision.42 In the matter at hand, the court concluded, these conditions had
been met, and it affirmed the first instance court decision in favor of the
employer and against the plaintiff's wrongful discharge claim, regardless of
whether she had been illegally discriminated against.43 Some courts have
followed the same rule, holding that where there is misrepresentation, the
question of discrimination is irrelevant to determining whether there has
been wrongful termination;44 other courts have awarded damages to
employees if they proved that they had been fired due to illegal
discrimination, but reduced the amount to account for the
misrepresentation.45 Moreover, other courts have held on occasion that the
mere fact that an employee lied about facts material to her employment
disqualified her for the job and, accordingly, denied the claim of wrongful
termination.46 However, in contexts unrelated to illegal discrimination,
some courts have shown tolerance towards employees who, by lying,
concealed from their employers when being hired that they are union
organizers or supporters, which put them at risk of not being hired.47
41

Id. at 411.
Id. at 414.
43
Id. at 415.
44
Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding
that because of the employee's fraud, the question of whether he was fired because of
discrimination is irrelevant); Sarvis v. Vermont State Coll., 772 A.2d (Ver. 2001) (applying
the same rule to non-disclosure by an employee regarding his prior criminal convictions).
45
Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., supra note 39 (allowing damages to the
employee for unlawful discrimination, but reducing those damages due to the employee's
misrepresentation); Wallace v. Dunn Const. Co., Inc., 968 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1992)
(same).
46
See Oak Lawn v. Human Rights Com., 133 Ill. App. 3d 221, 224 (Ill. App. 1985)
("Trustworthiness, reliability, good judgment, and integrity are all material qualifications for
any job, particularly one as a police officer. Her lying from the beginning disqualified her
from consideration for the position and made her an unfit employee for the Oak Lawn
Police Department."); Williams v. Boorstin, 663 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that the
lying itself—as to the plaintiff's legal education—disqualified him as an employee at the
Library of Congress).
47
See Hartman Bros. Heating & Air Conditioning v. NLRB, 280 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 2002),
where the court decided that lying to hide union activities should not be sanctioned, since
the employer should not refuse to hire an employee for this reason, and therefore the
information about union activities is immaterial. The court noted, however, that information
about union activities could have some (legitimate) value for the employer who might want
to keep an eye on a worker whose allegiance implies that he will not do full-time work. But
since the issue was not raised at trial, the court did not consider its applicability in the case
42
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The rules that emerge from the case–law, therefore, seem to weigh in
favor of John, the Muslim lawyer, in our example. This would certainly be
the outcome under the Johnson criteria:48 the false information John
provided to the law firm about his religion did not relate to measuring him
for employment there, and the firm did not rely, or was not entitled to rely,
on this false information in making its hiring decision. If the employer is
discriminatory and admits that religion matters in its hiring decisions, then
it is probably John's religion, rather than his dishonesty, that motivated the
firm's decision to fire him. To be sure, the mere fact that John lied should
not disqualify him for being hired as a lawyer. As we explained above,
such lies serve minorities to protect themselves from discrimination.
Therefore, the law firm's decision to fire John for lying should be
considered unlawful and cannot constitute a legal basis for terminating his
employment.
Note that instead of permitting John and similarly situated employees
to lie, the law could simply prohibit employers from asking job applicants
about their religion or other personal traits and characteristics that are
immaterial to their employment. This would be less effective, however,
than sanctioning lies: even if employers were to refrain from asking such
questions, those employees who would expect to be treated favorably by
discriminatory employers would voluntarily convey information about such
irrelevant traits and characteristics to employers, even if not asked.
Consequently, only (or mainly) employees who are at risk of discrimination
(for example, Muslims) would remain silent and be subject to negative
treatment from discriminatory employers. Moreover, prohibiting
employees from volunteering irrelevant personal information to employers
would be unenforceable and, therefore, ineffective.
2. Self-Incrimination
Consider the following example:
Example 2: Lying to the Police. A police interrogator asks a
suspect being interrogated whether he owns the weapon used in the
crime under investigation. If the suspect invokes the Fifth
Amendment and refuses to answer, it will signal to the police that
he is, indeed, the owner. The police might consequently decide to
invest resources—in costly DNA testing, for example—to try to
connect the suspect to the gun and eventually produce sufficient
evidence to convict him. Anticipating this possibility in advance,
the suspect lies to the interrogator and states that the gun does not

at hand. See also Leiser Constr., LLC v. NLRB, 281 Fed. Appx. 781 (10th Cir. 2008)
(holding that not disclosing information to a potential employer about union membership is
legitimate, citing Hartman Bros. Heating & Air Conditioning, id).
48
Supra note 40.
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belong to him. As a result, the police release the suspect. Later, the
police discover that the suspect lied, although it also becomes
apparent that someone else had stolen the gun from him and
committed the crime. The former suspect is now brought to trial for
perjury. Should he be convicted for lying to the police?
The Fifth Amendment provides that "no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself."49 Courts read this clause
as establishing a constitutional right against self-incrimination, permitting
any person, including suspects, witnesses, and defendants to remain silent
and refuse to respond to questions, either before or during trial, when the
answers could incriminate them.50
To guarantee this right, courts are prohibited from drawing adverse
inferences from the fact that a suspect has refused to answer questions
during the police interrogation51 or from a defendant's refusal to testify in
court.52 In order to minimize the effect of such silence on the jury, the
prosecution is not even allowed to comment on the fact that the defendant
chose to remain silent.53 However, a suspect or defendant who chooses to
answer questions relating to a specific issue is not allowed to refuse to
answer other questions relating to the same issue, and any such refusal
49

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) ("the Fifth Amendment privilege is
available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings
in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to
incriminate themselves"). See also Gordon Van Kessel, Quieting the Guilty and Acquitting
the Innocent: A Close Look at a New Twist on the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REV. 925,
926-28 (2002) (reviewing the recent reinforcement of the right to silence and its guarantees).
51
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) ("it would be fundamentally unfair and a
deprivation of due process ... to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an
explanation subsequently offered at trial"). The justification for this rule is that suspects
might misunderstand the Miranda warnings as an assurance that silence will not be used
against them in any way. That is not to say, however, that such a rule is mandated by the
Fifth Amendment itself. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 235 (1980) ("the Fifth
Amendment is not violated when a defendant who testifies in his own defense is impeached
with his prior silence").
52
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (holding that the Fifth Amendment
"forbids either comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the
court that such silence is evidence of guilt"); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J.
SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 18 (9th ed. 2012)
("The Supreme Court has construed this provision [the Fifth Amendment] to imply that the
government cannot require a criminal defendant to take the witness stand, cannot invite a
jury to draw adverse inferences from a defendant's refusal to testify, and cannot in any other
way compel the defendant to disclose potentially incriminating facts about the case.").
Others have raised questions about the effects of these rules, see, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano,
425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976) (noting that a decision that was based on the prohibition to draw
adverse inference from silence, while rooted in the Fifth Amendment, "has little to do with a
fair trial and derogates rather than improves the chances for accurate decisions"); The
Honorable Edwin Meese III, Promoting Truth in the Courtroom, 40 VAND. L. REV. 271,
(1987) (arguing that the Miranda rules, as well as Griffin, Doyle, and other "truth-defeating
doctrines," impede the search for truth and are in no sense required by the Constitution).
53
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 609.
50
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could be counted against him or her.54 This restriction on the right to
silence is mostly applicable to testimony in court55 and not to police
interrogations.56
It is commonly asserted that the right to silence promotes fairness,
privacy, individualism, free will, and personal dignity, while at the same
time preventing torture, inhumane treatment, and "the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt."57 Another rationale, first proposed by
William Stuntz is that without a right to silence, lying to avoid selfincrimination would be a natural and even reasonable choice and perjury
should be excusable. The right to silence provides a sufficient alternative to
lying and therefore enables the prohibition on perjury and prevention of its
negative effects.58 Daniel Seidmann and Alex Stein have offered an

54

Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951) ("where criminating facts have been
voluntarily revealed, the privilege cannot be invoked to avoid disclosure of the details");
United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Having voluntarily
given the agent their version of the events, the Davenports forfeited their privilege not to
answer questions concerning that version."); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475-76 (clarifying that
"there is no room for the contention that the privilege is waived if the individual answers
some questions or gives some information on his own prior to invoking his right to remain
silent when interrogated").
55
Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900) ("while no inference of guilt can be
drawn from his refusal to avail himself of the privilege of testifying, he has no right to set
forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a crossexamination upon those facts"); Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 156 (1958) (a
witness "could not take the stand to testify in her own behalf and also claim the right to be
free from cross-examination on matters raised by her own testimony on direct
examination").
56
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 n.104 (1966) (explaining that the limitations on
the ability to answer only some of the questions are mostly relevant to a witness in court and
not to the interrogation stage).
57
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). See also Ullmann
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956) (holding that while the right to silence might
occasionally protect the guilty, it is aimed at preventing a greater evil, which is the abuse of
government power and the recurrence of brutal interrogation mechanisms); Vincent Martin
Bonventre, An Alternative for the Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 49
BROOKLYN L. REV. 31, 51-64 (1982) (reviewing policies of mercy, privacy, and fairness and
arguing that they provide compelling justifications for preserving the right to silence);
Gordon Van Kessel, supra note 50, at 929 (reviewing the conventional justifications for the
right to silence and rejecting them); Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence
Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114
HARV. L. REV. 430, 435-36 (2000) (pointing to the civil-libertarian values that are
commonly used to support the right to silence).
58
William J. Stuntz, Self-Incrimination and Excuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1988). Yet,
the right to silence does have its critics. Jeremy Bentham argued that the right to silence
only helps the guilty, because only they exercise it, JEREMY BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON
JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 241 (M. Dumont ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. ed. 1981) (1825). Modern
critics argue that the right lacks a coherent rationale and that all its defenders have failed to
offer a convincing justification. See, e.g., David Dolinko, Is There a Rationale for the Right
Against Self-Incrimination?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1063 (1986) (attacking the many suggested
justifications offered for the right and claiming that it lacks a coherent rationale); Michael S.
Green, The Privilege's Last Stand: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to
Rebel Against the State, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 627, 628 (1999) (same); Ronald J. Allen,
Miranda's Hollow Core, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 71 (2006) (same).
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innovative rationale for the right to silence: that this right in fact protects
the innocent.59
Yet no one, to the best of our knowledge, has suggested reading the
Fifth Amendment as permitting lying—as opposed to remaining silent—in
order to avoid self-incrimination. Is there basis to a prima-facie claim that
lies in cases represented by Example 2 create social value and should thus
be tolerated? The answer to this question will vary depending on the
rationale adopted for the right against self-incrimination and its
accompanying right to silence. The traditional justifications for these rights
could support such a claim.
Assume that the right to silence is intended to prevent torture,
inhumane treatment, and the need to choose between self-accusation,
perjury, and contempt that the state (by way of the police, prosecution, and
courts) might impose on suspects, defendants, or witnesses.60 Arguably,
since the decision to remain silent—as well as to selectively refuse to
answer specific questions—could, at times, function as a signal of guilt, it
could also provoke the torture and inhumane treatment of the person
keeping silent. Thus, on the assumption that the right to silence is aimed at
constraining the government from engaging in the noted types of
undesirable conduct—which is at the essence of the constitutional right
against self-incrimination—the right to keep silent should be supported by
an even more powerful right, namely, the right to lie in response to certain
incriminating questions when silence does not suffice as protection.
Thus, in Example 2, if the suspect were to refuse to answer the police
interrogator's questions, this would signal to the police that he has
something to hide regarding his connection to the weapon used in the
crime. This signal would encourage the police to invest more resources in
investigating the suspect’s involvement in the crime and to perhaps even
subject him to inhumane treatment. Indeed, the police have no reason to
mistreat suspects who cooperate, but might be thus motivated by a suspect's
choice to remain silent. Silence, therefore, “invites” inhumane treatment
and could lead a suspect to eventually incriminate himself. Accordingly,
lying is often the only reasonable option for a suspect to avoid both
inhumane treatment and self-incrimination.
Yet as we show further on in our discussion,61 under alternative, more
compelling justifications for the right to silence, a constitutional right to lie
during interrogation would create externalities that could lead to the
conclusion that such a right, even if it generates some social value, would
yield more harm than benefit.

59

Seidmann & Stein, supra note 57. We discuss their theory in detail in Section C and
explain its relevance to our arguments.
60
Infra text accompanying note 57.
61
Infra Part II.B.2.
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3. Free-Riding
Thus far, all the lies we have discussed serve the self-interest of the
liar. We now turn to focus on cases in which the liar’s goal is to protect
third parties from abuse, in particular through free-riding, by the deceived
party. Example 3, below, illustrates such cases:
Example 3: Vaccination. A patient asks his doctor whether he
should get vaccinated against polio. The doctor knows that given
that a certain proportion of the population either already is or will
be vaccinated against the disease, and given the risks of the
vaccine, it is in her patient's best interest—from a medical
perspective62—not to get vaccinated and instead free-ride on
people who do get vaccinated. The doctor also knows that if all
doctors were to give their patients sincere advice that takes into
account only the patients' self-interest, too many people would not
get vaccinated and public health would be at risk. Should the
doctor be allowed to lie to her patient and thereby persuade him to
get vaccinated?63
The value of lying to the patient in Example 3 is straightforward:
vaccinations create a public good that might not be produced if doctors are
not allowed to lie as in this example.64 A public good is characterized by its
producer’s inability to exclude others from consuming it. Thus, people tend
to free-ride on the producer’s investment and refuse to share the costs of
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From a broader perspective, taking the vaccine could still serve the patient's interest:
avoiding the vaccine could trigger social condemnation, which many patients would not be
indifferent to.
63
See Fran Carnerie, Crisis and Informed Consent: Analysis of a Law-Medicine
Malocclusion, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 55, 78 (1986). The author presented here an amicus
curiae brief prepared by the Conference of State and Territorial Epidemiologists in the case
of Reyes v. Wyeth Labs, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), in which "[a]uthorities argued
that the risk of vaccine-induced polio should not be communicated to the recipients
precisely because it might cause some people to refuse vaccination. Since officials thought
that the success of the entire disease prevention program would be endangered, they opted
to withhold the risk disclosure, a policy which was consistent with the practice of clinic
physicians who administered the vaccine." This approach was not adopted by the court in
Reynes.
64
See John C. Hershey, The Roles of Altruism, Free Riding, and Bandwagoning in
Vaccination Decisions, 59 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 177, 178
(1994) (explaining the free-riding problem in the context of vaccinations); Wendy E Parmet,
Informed Consent and Public Health: Are They Compatible When It Comes to Vaccines?, 8
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 71, 74-75 (2005) (same); Christine Parkins, Protecting the
Herd: A Public Health, Economics, and Legal Argument for Taxing Parents Who Opt-Out
of Mandatory Childhood Vaccinations, 21 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 437, 463-66 (explaining
the free-riding problem with vaccination and suggesting to tax those who refuse it); Doren
D. Fredrickson et al., Childhood Immunization Refusal: Provider and Parent Perceptions,
36 FAM. MED. 431, 436 (2004) (noting that "some non-immunizing parents are aware that
their children may be at lower risk if most other children in the community are
immunized").
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producing the public good. As a result, without government intervention,
many public goods whose production is efficient are not created.65 Public
health is one such public good, and vaccination programs are one way of
promoting and securing this public good. While the state could compel
people to get vaccinated if public health is at risk,66 such governmental
intervention could be either politically infeasible or too costly to enforce.
An alternative, it could be argued, is to permit doctors to deceive their
patients when free-riding is a major impediment to promoting public
health.
Currently, the law does not allow doctors to lie to their patients even if
the lies would be paternalistic and serve the patients' best interests. In our
discussion of paternalistic lies in Part IV, we point out how in certain rare
instances, permitting such lies to be told by doctors could be
accommodated by the law as well as consistent with medical ethics.67 But
for the present, we focus on lies aimed at protecting third parties or the
public at large, which are clearly not tolerated by the law. The main reason
for the resistance to such lies is the conception that lying to a patient is a
breach of trust and violation of the Hippocratic Oath: most patients believe
that the sole consideration that their doctor takes, and should take, into
account when treating or advising them is their best interest.68
However, doctors are often, in fact, motivated by concern for public
health, which does not necessarily coincide with their patients' best
interests.69 In the case of vaccinations, for example, doctors are not
65

Ariel Porat, Private Production of Public Goods: Liability for Unrequested Benefits, 108
MICH. L. REV. 189 (2009) (explaining why efficient public goods are often not created and
offering solutions); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences,
and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J. 377 (1998) (explaining the nature of
public goods and the potential free-riding problem that may prevent their creation).
66
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 15 (1905) (holding that a compulsory smallpox
vaccination for adults who are fit subjects of vaccination is constitutional); Zucht v. King,
260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (dismissing a suit challenging city ordinances that make
vaccination a prerequisite for attending school). See also Parmet, supra note 64, at 78-81
(explaining the policy of compulsory vaccination while presenting some exemptions that
states provide from the vaccination requirement); Sara Mahmoud-Davis, Balancing Public
Health and Individual Choice: A Proposal for a Federal Emergency Vaccination Law, 20
HEALTH MATRIX 219, 244 (2010) ("In a nationwide or multi-state emergency where time is
limited to inoculate the population, permitting individuals to claim an exemption based on
their personal moral, ethical, or philosophical beliefs would likely: (1) seriously risk
vaccination rates falling below the herd immunity threshold; and (2) jeopardize the
efficiency of vaccine distribution by overtaxing limited resources to process exemption
requests.").
67
Infra Part IV.A.
68
BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, 44 FR 23192, 23192-23194
(Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare Apr. 18, 1979) (explaining the ethical principles of
respect for persons and beneficence, which require that physicians respect patients'
autonomy and maximize their potential benefits while minimizing their risks).
69
Fran Carnerie, supra note 63, at 77-78 (arguing that the doctrine of informed consent is
fraught with exceptions and "gray areas" and noting as one of the reasons for this that "in
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required by law to disclose to their patients that it is in their best interest to
free-ride on other patients and refuse to get vaccinated.70 Given this, then,
why does the law not take the further step of permitting doctors to lie in
this context? When lying is prohibited but non-disclosure permitted, the
more sophisticated patients—those who know to ask the "right"
questions—are better off and the less sophisticated patients are worse off.71
In practice, doctors not only withhold information from their patients
in order to serve the public interest, but they also sometimes lie, and the
law seems to tolerate this. Best exemplifying this is the use of placebos in
clinical drug trials.72 Doctors will usually inform the patients participating
in the trials that there is some likelihood that they will be given a placebo.73
But what if a patient asks the doctor directly during the course of treatment
whether he is receiving a placebo? Should the doctor say that he does not
know even if he does so as not to harm the integrity of the trial?74 An
inaccurate answer will often promote the public good at the expense of the
patient's good. Indeed, commentators have noted that doctors often resort to
deception in administering placebos to patients in non-experimental
settings, so as to increase the placebo effect.75
the realm of public health ... physicians have subordinated individual values to the perceived
greater utilitarian goals of public health, as is the case with quarantine laws, public water
fluorination and vaccination against infectious disease"); Julie Leask et al., Communicating
with Parents about Vaccination: A Framework for Health Professionals, 12 BMC
PEDIATRICS 154 (2012), http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2431/12/154 (indicating that
in administering vaccinations, doctors should take into account both their patients' interests
as well as the public interest).
70
This might explain why the information provided by public health authorities regarding
vaccines highlights mostly individualist considerations for being vaccinated, without
mentioning the benefits to the public, even though the latter are often the main reason why
the government requires vaccinations. See Parmet, supra note 64, at 109 (reviewing this
public health authorities' approach, but arguing that the positive effects of vaccinating for
others should be explained to parents, and might encourage, rather than dissuade, them from
vaccinating their children).
71
Yet if lying were permitted, many sophisticated patients would have alternate ways of
finding out the truth and would not be misled by their doctors' deceptive advice. See infra
Part II.C.
72
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(i) (1999), defining placebo control as follows: "The test
drug is compared with an inactive preparation designed to resemble the test drug as far as
possible. A placebo-controlled study may include additional treatment groups, such as an
active treatment control or a dose-comparison control, and usually includes randomization
and blinding of patients or investigators, or both."
73
Robert J. Levine, The Use of Placebos in Randomized Clinical Trials, 7 IRB 1, 1 (1985)
(noting that in a placebo-controlled randomized clinical trial, each prospective subject is
told his or her chances of receiving an inert substance.
74
See Nancy K. Plant, Adequate Well-Controlled Clinical Trials: Reopening the Black Box,
1 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 267, 272 (1996) (noting that the FDA generally requires that
placebo-controlled studies be double-blinded as well: neither the patient nor the doctorinvestigator knows what the patient is receiving, in order to neutralize bias on both sides).
75
Robert J. Levine, The Use of Placebos in Randomized Clinical Trials, 7 IRB 1, 1 (1985)
(noting that when using placebos in medical practice, doctors wish to produce a strong
placebo effect and, therefore, use deception; but when using placebo-control in a clinical
trial, the investigator's interest is usually to minimize the placebo effect, so as to prove the
superiority of the active treatment, and therefore deception will be minimized).
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There is a substantive difference in the doctor's deception of the
patient in the placebo context and the vaccination context, however. In the
case of placebos, the patient typically consents to participate in the trial as
well as to the risk that he will receive a placebo. Arguably, he also takes on
the risk that he might be deceived, if necessary, to prevent him from
knowing whether he received the experimental drug or placebo.76 Prior
consent is often mandatory for patients to participate in clinical trials,
which generally increase their probability of recovering or surviving.77 The
understanding between the patient and doctor conducting the trial, which
sets out the "rules of the game," makes non-disclosure and even lying to the
patient in the event that he receives a placebo more tolerable than doctors'
deceit in the context of vaccinations. Accordingly, perhaps in the case of
vaccinations as well, a patient's prior agreement to, or at least prior
awareness of the possibility of his doctor lying would make the lies
tolerable. Specifically, an agreement between the doctor and her patient
stipulating that under certain, well-defined conditions, the doctor's loyalty
is not limited only to the patient but extends to others as well or, more
broadly, to public health might legitimize lies like the one described in
Example 3. As an analogy, it is certainly not uncommon for doctors to be
required in times of emergency to decide which patient among many to
treat, even if this will be to the detriment of some. The justification for
lying in the vaccination case is an extension of the rationale for the
unavoidable choice in emergency situations: doctors should not promote
their patients' interests without due regard for the interests of other
patients—even if not their own patients. Indeed, if, in Example 3, it had
been the health officials who had lied to the patient, and not his doctor,
most people would not find it questionable that the authorities set
promoting public health as their primary goal and thus lie to potential freeriders.78

76

But see Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible Research
or Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 484-87 (2001) (arguing that the informed
consent process in clinical trials is often severely flawed, that "human subjects often do not
exercise their autonomy in a meaningful way either because they are given insufficient
information or because they do not comprehend the data they receive," and that some
investigators even resent informed consent requirements in these situations); Belmont
Report, supra note 68, at 23194 (explaining that in most research cases, human subjects
must participate voluntarily, although in some situations, such as participants who are
prisoners, the applicability of this principle is notas obvious).
77
Hoffman, supra note 76, at 482-83 (arguing that patients choose to participate in clinical
trials involving placebo control because they believe that they will benefit from
participating, "even when they are clearly informed that there is a fifty-fifty chance that they
will not receive active treatment").
78
See Ruth R. Faden, Ethical Issues in Government Sponsored Public Health Campaigns,
14 HEALTH EDUC. BEHAV. 27 (1987) (discussing health campaigns sponsored by the
government and making the subtle distinction between persuasion and manipulation for
promoting public health). See also Lynn Kozlowski & Richard O'Connor, Apply Federal
Research Rules on Deception to Misleading Health Information, 118 PUB. HEALTH REP.
187, 191 (2003) (“Public health needs can sometimes override individual needs and rights.
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B. Dilution of the Truth-Signal
A certain social value to permitting lying is apparent in all the cases of
anti-abuse lies discussed in the preceding section. But as with the other
categories of lies, the crucial question here is the impact of legally
authorizing these anti-abuse lies on the truth-signal. As the discussion
below will show, lies intended to prevent discrimination dilute the truthsignal, but in a way that increases, rather than decreases, the social value of
lying. This is not the case with regard to lies told to protect people from
self-incrimination or to prevent free-riding. In these two types of cases, the
dilution of the truth-signal is genuinely vexing, and therefore, if lying is to
be permitted at all in such cases, the line between permissible and
impermissible lies must be carefully drawn.
1. Discrimination
If job candidates are permitted to lie about immaterial personal
characteristics, truth-telling candidates will find it more difficult to convey
information to their potential employers. In particular, if Muslims were
allowed to lie about their religion, employers would not believe nonMuslim candidates when they say that they are not Muslim.
This outcome is not a concern but a virtue, however: the goal of
legitimizing lying when there is potential for discriminatory treatment by
an employer is to make it harder—ideally impossible—for those employers
to distinguish between liars (for example, Muslims who pretend to be nonMuslims) and truth-tellers (for example, non-Muslims who want to identify
themselves as such). The more crucial question, of whether these lies
would be effective in realizing their goal, is considered in Section C below.
2. Self-Incrimination
Things are much more complicated with lies represented by Example
2 (Lying to the Police). If defendants, suspects, and witnesses were allowed
to lie in order to avoid self-incrimination, truth-tellers would find it more
difficult to convey information to the court, prosecution, and police, which
could lead to more false convictions. As Example 2 illustrates, a right to lie
in such cases might, in fact, protect some innocent suspects whose silence
would be interpreted as incriminating by the police. However, the
advantage in preventing a certain amount of false convictions by permitting

This should happen, though, only under well-defined circumstances. Disinformation should
not, however, be employed unless the standards for research ethics can be met. In practice,
this will almost certainly mean that deception has no ethical place in the public health
toolkit.”); Nurit Guttman, Ethical Dilemmas in Health Campaigns, 9 HEALTH COMMUN. 155
(1997) (discussing the conflict between respecting people's autonomy and the public good in
health campaigns). But see Parmet, supra note 64, at 109-10 (arguing for honest vaccination
campaigns by governments).
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lying may be more than offset by the increase in the risk of false conviction
due to this right to lie.
Interestingly, as Seidmann and Stein have pointed out, the absence of
a right to silence would also dilute the truth-signal. Under such a legal
regime, many guilty people who remain silent under the current rule would
lie; there would consequently be a lower ratio between truth-telling and
lying defendants or suspects. This is grounded on the realistic assumption
that the proportion of guilty people among those who invoke the right to
silence is relatively high, and if forced to speak, many would lie.79 Thus,
under the present regime, which recognizes the right to silence but not a
right to lie, the truth-signal of those who choose to speak is stronger than
under either of the alternatives: namely, a regime without the right to
silence and a regime that allows lying to avoid self-incrimination.80
Our conclusion is that lies that are told to avoid self-incrimination
entail substantial costs in terms of the dilution of the truth-signal, which
could often adversely affect the innocent. We therefore propose that only in
a very narrow set of cases should lies to avoid self-incrimination be
tolerated. Specifically, such lies should be permitted when a question is
asked with the sole purpose of inducing the defendant, suspect, or witness
to incriminate him or herself by keeping silent, so that lying is the only way
to avoid self-incrimination. It could be hard to identify such questions
either ex ante or ex post, and if this difficulty cannot be overcome, an
outright prohibition on such lies would, of course, be justified. We contend,
however, that some such questions could, nonetheless, be thus identified. In
extreme cases, if the police or a prosecutor asks a suspect whether he
committed the crime under investigation, answering "no" should not
constitute perjury even if it is later proven that the suspect did in fact
commit the crime. Indeed, it seems to be common practice not to charge
convicted defendants with perjury simply for having proclaimed their
innocence.81
79

Stein & Seidmann, supra note 57 (explaining that while the right of silence does make it
harder to convict some guilty defendants, its positive anti-pooling effect makes it "as
justified as any other rule of criminal procedure and evidence that reduces the rate of
erroneous convictions by increasing the rate of erroneous acquittals"). For criticism, see
Stephanos Bibas, Response: The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L.
REV. 421 (2003) (criticizing the Seidmann and Stein theory and pointing out some of its
weaknesses); Gordon Van Kessel, supra note 50 (same).
80
Note, however, another argument to support permitting lies: under the current rule, which
prohibits lying, some innocent defendants and suspects choose to remain silent, fearing that
they will be trapped into giving self-incriminating answers. Given a right to lie, some of
them will be encouraged not to keep silent and instead cooperate with the police and
prosecution. Cf. Peter Arenella, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on the Implications for the
Criminal Justice System: Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1250 (1996)
(arguing that an innocent defendant might choose to remain silent in cases where "a jury
might not find his account plausible even if it was the truth").
81
"The 'exculpatory no' defense prevents the government from punishing an individual for
giving a false negative answer in response to a government inquiry if a truthful affirmative
answer would have incriminated the individual, or if the individual reasonably believed that
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Finally, note that there could be intermediate options between the two
extremes of penalizing lying to avoid self-incrimination and complete
legitimation of such lies. For example, courts could be permitted to draw
negative inferences from lies—even if told to avoid self-incrimination—but
telling these lies would not constitute an offense in itself.
3. Free-Riding
Allowing doctors to lie to their patients gives rise to the risk that
patients will ignore their doctor's advice even when the latter is telling the
truth.82 This concern arises, to a certain degree, even under current law,
which allows doctors to refrain from disclosing to their patients that getting
vaccinated would not serve their self-interests; the dilution of doctors'
truth-signal would intensify were they allowed also to lie to their patients.
However, if lying were permitted in a set of very narrow and well–defined
circumstances, patients would know that in almost all cases they are not at
risk of being misled by their doctors. Under such a regime, the benefits of
lying might exceed its costs.
C. Effectiveness and Costs of Defense
Allowing lying to avoid discrimination, such as in the Muslim lawyer
example, could motivate discriminatory employers (and some non-Muslim
employment candidates) to take costly measures to ensure that only nonMuslims are hired. Arguably, these measures would enable discriminatory
employers to implement their discriminatory policies. Therefore, it would
seem that permitting such anti-abuse lies would only increase overall costs
and would not reduce discrimination.
But, we argue, this is not necessarily so. First, under a legal regime in
which employees are allowed to lie about personal characteristics that are
irrelevant to their employment, some discriminatory employers will abstain
from their discriminating practices in order to avoid the costs of such
conduct. For those employers, the right to lie would be effective and
achieve its goal. Second, while some discriminatory employers would still
choose to shoulder the costs of discriminating (which do not arise in a
a truthful affirmative answer would have been incriminating." United States v. Harrison, 20
M.J. 710, 711 (U.S. Army Court of Military Review 1985). This defense served as an
exception to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982) (Fraud and False Statements), but was later rejected
by the Supreme Court in Brogan v. United States (522 U.S. 398, 404 (1998) (rejecting the
"exculpatory no" defense and holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 covers any false statement,
including a "no" response, and that "neither the text nor the spirit of the Fifth Amendment
confers a privilege to lie").
82
Doren D. Fredrickson et al., Childhood Immunization Refusal: Provider and Parent
Perceptions, 36 FAM. MED. 431, 436-37 (2004) (showing that communication and trust
between doctors and parents affect parents' decisions whether to have their children
vaccinated); Parmet, supra note 64, at 97-100 (explaining the importance of trust and
informed consent for allowing successful vaccination of a population and for promoting
public health).
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regime prohibiting lies), these costs should be considered a legitimate
sanction for their discrimination, which makes it less rewarding.
In the context of lies to avoid self-incrimination (Example 2), it might
also be argued that they are ineffective and only lead to greater costs for all
parties involved. It would be costlier for the prosecution, as well as the
courts, to verify the authenticity of testimonies, while at the same time,
innocent suspects and defendants would incur higher costs to substantiate
their innocence. And if the eventual outcome is that all lies will be
detected, then there will be no value to permitting them, for this would do
nothing more than increase overall costs. However, the overall costs will
not be increased if the category of legitimate lies is restricted, as suggested
earlier, to untruthful responses to questions from the police that can be
easily identified as intended to lead to self-incrimination (asking whether
the suspect committed the crime, for example).
A different conclusion arises in the vaccination case (Example 3). As
explained, if doctors were allowed to lie in such situations, there would be
many patients who would find other sources of information to verify their
doctor's advice, perhaps simply searching the internet or sometimes taking
more costly measures. These efforts could often be successful, and the goal
of allowing doctors to lie would thus be frustrated. Moreover, patients who
are "successful" in their verification attempts will often be a more
sophisticated and, likely, wealthier population of patients, which could
raise distributive justice concerns.
We propose, therefore, that doctors should be allowed to lie for the
good of the public health only if the lie is effective: namely, only if the
costs that most patients must incur to detect their doctor's lie are greater
than the benefits they derive from detecting that lie. When this condition is
met, verification costs are necessarily eliminated. This tends to be typical in
the context of a doctor’s advice: a patient's medical profile is usually a
factor in determining his best interest, and therefore detecting his doctor's
lie would often entail significant cost (i.e., an internet search would not be
sufficient). Moreover, most vaccines pose an extremely low risk to those
being vaccinated; every patient derives at least some medical benefit from
the vaccination (even if accompanied by a risk); and a certain extent of
social stigma usually attaches to people who resist getting vaccinated and
free-ride on others. Therefore, patients generally would derive little benefit
from detecting their doctor's lie.
III. TRUTH-REVEALING LIES
Lying can be instrumental in revealing the truth in two central ways.
First, they can be used to extract valuable information from people who are
illegally, or undesirably, concealing this information. Second, lies can be
used to shake the reliability of liars who disseminate false and harmful
information. In this Part, we discuss these two contexts of truth-revealing
lies, first making the prima-facie case for lying, then discussing its impact
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on the truth-signal, and, lastly, considering the effectiveness of permitting
such lies to be told.
A. The Prima-Facie Case and the Law
1. Extracting Information
The following example illustrates how lies can trigger the generation
of information that might otherwise not be uncovered.
Example 4. Lying to a Suspect. A police interrogator asks a suspect
whether he is the owner of the weapon used in the crime under
investigation. The suspect knows that if he confirms ownership of
the weapon, his chances of conviction are high. He therefore
falsely denies any connection to the weapon. The interrogator then
shows the suspect fake testimony supposedly given by his friend,
indicating that the latter admitted that the weapon is the suspect's
property. The suspect is convinced that denying ownership of the
weapon is futile and therefore confesses not only to owning it but
also to committing the crime. Is his confession admissible given
that it was generated by a lie?83
It is common practice for the police to manipulate suspects in order to
extract valuable information from them. Lying is often the most effective
tactic for this and is commonly deemed legal in court.84
Consequently, police interrogators often lie to suspects during
83

For similar cases, see Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992) (police
lied to a rape suspect about the existence of a witness against him); Wilson v.
Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 549, 555 (1992) (police lied to a suspect about being
identified by the victim in a line-up).
84
See Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1,
34-40 (2010) (arguing that truth-exposing lies, as opposed to lies that distort the truth, have
positive effects and should be allowed); Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation
Practices: How Far Is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168 (2001) (arguing that the value of
deceptive interrogation tactics outweighs their costs and that there is no reason to single
them out from other causes of wrongful conviction). Others believe that such lies should be
forbidden or at least restricted. See Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in
Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425, 476 (1996) (arguing that police lying may impede
evidence-gathering by creating distrust and suspicion, which reduce cooperation, and by
extracting false confessions, while at the same time diminishing the integrity of the police
and criminal justice system as a whole); Laura Hoffman Roppe, Comment, True Blue?
Whether Police Should Be Allowed to Use Trickery and Deception to Extract Confessions,
31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (1994) (arguing that police deception deprives the suspect of the
fundamental fairness of the justice system, leads to false confessions, and undermines public
trust in the police and judicial system). Others suggest a more balanced approach between
these two perspectives. See, e.g., Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution:
Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 111
(1997) (suggesting to constrain only those interrogation methods that are likely to elicit false
confessions and to consider the vulnerability of the specific suspect).
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interrogation about the existence of incriminating evidence or witnesses85
or about an accomplice who allegedly confessed and placed the blame on
the suspect.86 Under prevailing law, a confession given by suspects in
response to such lies is admissible in court,87 despite more and more
research indicating the rate of false confessions to be very high. 88 The law
also allows the police to use undercover agents to gather evidence, an
activity that also involves extensive lying.89
Lawyers, however, are not allowed to lie to witnesses in crossexamination90 and in both civil and criminal proceedings litigants are not
permitted to lie in their pleas and responses to the court, even if this is done
in an attempt to extract valuable information from the other side.91 Why is
85

See supra note 83. See also Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 266, 279 (1996) (noting that in 30% of the interrogations observed, the
detective began the interrogation session by confronting the suspect with false evidence).
86
United States v. Petary, 857 F.2d 458, 460 (8th Cir. 1988) (FBI agents lied to a
kidnapping suspect in order to get a confession, telling him that his partner was in the
process of confessing and would probably put full blame on him).
87
See supra notes 83, 86.
88
See Talia Fisher & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, The Confessional Penalty, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
871, 872 (2008) (explaining that research has shown that a considerable number of
confessions are in fact false and often lead to wrongful convictions); Steven A. Drizin &
Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV.
891, 921 (2004) (suggesting that "interrogation-induced false confession may be a bigger
problem for the American criminal justice system than ever before ").
89
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (finding evidence admissible when a federal
agent, who lied about his identity and asked to purchase narcotics, was invited into the
defendant's home, where an unlawful narcotics transaction was consummated); Christopher
Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV.
775, 778 (1997) ("Undercover work is by definition deceptive. It normally involves outright
lies … [I]n playing such roles, lying is inevitable and extensive.").
90
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2013) (forbidding an attorney from making
false statements of fact to a tribunal or offer false evidence); id. R. 3.4(e) ("A lawyer shall
not ... in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or
that will not be supported by admissible evidence."); id. R. 8.4 (it is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation"). See also Tory L. Lucas, To Catch a Criminal, to Cleanse a Profession:
Exposing Deceptive Practices by Attorneys to the Sunlight of Public Debate and Creating
an Express Investigation Deception Exception to the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 89 NEB. L. REV. 219 (2010) (reviewing attorneys' use of certain deceptive tactics
and arguing that the ABA Model Rules should allow attorneys to use deception as part of an
investigation but not in court). But see Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous
Representation—Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 771, 781-82 (2006) ("by considering the larger legal context of the
lawyer's role ... there are circumstances in which a lawyer can ethically make a false
statement of fact to a tribunal").
91
In civil litigation, different rules are applied to prevent the use of deceptive tactics by the
litigants, represented by attorneys. Perhaps the most prominent such rule is that precluding
attorneys from communicating, or causing another to communicate, with other represented
parties without obtaining counsel's consent. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR
7-104(A)(1) (1980); Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 (1992). The rule
prevents lawyers from taking advantage of another lawyer's client and renders most
deceptive tactics ineffective. For a discussion of this rule, see Ernest F. Lidge III,
Government Civil Investigations and the Ethical Ban on Communicating with Represented
Parties, 67 IND. L.J. 549, 560 (1992).
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lying to suspects during police interrogations mostly considered legal but
lying in court not? An intuitive justification for this rule is that lying to the
court constitutes contempt of court. This rationale, taken by itself, is not
sufficiently convincing, at least not for a general prohibition on lying in
court proceedings. Take, for example, the case of lies told by an attorney in
cross–examination, which are short-lived: the purpose of such lies is to trap
the witness who is giving false testimony, whether intentionally or
unwittingly, and soon thereafter—sometimes in the space of minutes—
expose the lie and reveal the truth. It could even be argued that this
"temporary" act of lying is not actually a lie. Thus, an attorney's use of a lie
as a truth-revealing tactic during cross-examination should not be
considered contempt of court, for it is no more than an instrument for
eliciting the truth from a liar.
Another possible objection to allowing lying in court is that if lawyers
and litigants were permitted to do so without sanction, they would be able
to quite easily insert self-serving lies into the evidence presented to the
judge and jury, which in no way serves the end of revealing the truth.92
Thus, allowing lies, even if limited to the context of cross-examinations,
could backfire and in fact undermine, rather than promote, the exposure of
the truth.93
Given this concern, then, we propose that the law permit lies to be told
by litigants and attorneys in court, but if, and only if, the lies are revealed
as such quickly enough by the liar, so that the court's function of exposing
the truth is not compromised. Thus, for example, a lawyer would be
permitted to lie to a witness she is cross-examining if she discloses the truth
before the witness steps down from the stand.94
In addition to police interrogations and courtroom proceedings, there
are other contexts in which lies could have a truth-revealing effect and
where a question arises as to whether lying should be permitted. One such
situation would be the case of a journalist who is investigating the sanitary
conditions in the meat department of a certain supermarket and, to gain
access to the store, pretends he is interested in a job there and is hired.95 A
similar case is a reporter investigating grave complaints made by patients
92

See Wilson, supra note 84, at 34 (distinguishing truth-exposing lies from lies that distort
truth and arguing why the first type should be allowed whereas the second should be
forbidden).
93
Another reason for prohibiting lies in court, as opposed to police interrogations, relates to
the different degrees of effectiveness of lies in the respective contexts. We consider this
issue at infra Part III.C.
94
There could be exceptions to this rule: if there is more than one witness, for example, it
may be justified to wait to reveal the lie so that it can be used in a number of crossexaminations.
95
In Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999), reporters
gained employment in the plaintiff's supermarkets by misrepresentation and secretly
videotaped unwholesome food handling practices. The court found the reporters liable for
disloyalty towards the employer and for trespass, but denied the plaintiff's claim for
reputation damages, due to the lack of actual malice on the defendants' part.
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of eye clinics who gains access to the clinics by pretending to be a
patient.96 Another example is a food critic who reviews restaurants while
presenting himself as a patron.97 In all three cases, should the lies be
tolerated as truth-revealing or should the liars be considered trespassers by
the law? Saul Levmore, discussing these and other cases, suggests that a
loose cost-benefit analysis could justify some of the deceptions.98
2. Undermining the Credibility of False Information
Lies can also be used to undermine the credibility of false information.
Such lies can be characterized as defensive lies. Example 5, below,
illustrates how these lies operate.
Example 5. Countering Defamation. Plaintiff, a journalist,
publishes in her newspaper that Defendant, a candidate for a highranking position in a large firm, sexually harassed one of his
employees. Although this is false, Defendant does not have enough
time to effectively refute the item before the firm's board of
directors decides on whether to appoint him or someone else to the
position. Defendant therefore issues a statement to the press that
not only did the sexual harassment never take place, but Plaintiff
was actually paid by Defendant's adversaries to frame him. This
accusation is in fact a lie, intended to undermine Plaintiff's personal
credibility and the credibility of her false accusation about
Defendant. Plaintiff sues Defendant for defamation. Should the
court rule in her favor?99

96

In Desnick v. ABC, 44 F.3d 1345, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995), television reporters used
undercover surveillance by test patients at eye clinics. The court dismissed the plaintiffs'
claim of trespass, holding, "If the broadcast itself does not contain actionable defamation,
and no established rights are invaded in the process of creating it … then the target has no
legal remedy even if the investigatory tactics used by the network are surreptitious,
confrontational, unscrupulous, and ungentlemanly."
97
Levmore, supra note 1, at 1366 (explaining the source of the common intuition that a
restaurant critic's deceit and apparent trespass is to be forgiven: "the overwhelming majority
of restaurants would agree in advance to an undercover visit by a critic masquerading as a
mere patron"). See also Am. Transmission, Inc. v. Channel 7, 609 N.W.2d 607, 609 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2000) (reporters pretended to be customers at transmission repair shops and then
aired a story about dishonest practices that they encountered. The court held that plaintiffs
had failed to prove that defamatory implications were materially false, and that plaintiff
consented to reporter's presence on their premises).
98
Levmore, supra note 1, at 1374 ("The theory… is that deception is tolerated where the
social benefits of deception exceed the costs, taking into account alternative remedies that
can deter deception and reduce its costs"). Levmore has not, however, discussed the
problem of the dilution of the truth-signal or, moreover, the effectiveness of such lies if
permitted.
99
For a case with similar circumstances, see Mencher v. Chesley, 193 Misc. 829 (N.Y
1948), in which a company executive issued a statement to the press regarding the grounds
for dismissing the chairman at the same company. The dismissed chairman responded by
publicly declaring that the executive was a Communist and that he used his position to
remove the chairman.
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The question here is whether a "defensive lie" defense will be
recognized in such circumstances. People whose rights are infringed by
others can sometimes react aggressively, even violently, and then later,
when sued for their conduct, successfully claim self-defense. In our
example, however, things diverge from the classic self-defense scenario in
a few respects. First, it is unclear from the details of the example whether
Plaintiff committed an actionable wrong against Defendant.100 Second and
more importantly, the lie published by Defendant is an indirect act of selfdefense: it is aimed at damaging Plaintiff's reputation and thereby shake the
credibility of the claim she made against Defendant. The lie thus created
collateral damage—the dissemination of false information to the public—
which is typically absent in self-defense cases.101
The Restatement (Second) of Torts has recognized a self-defense
privilege for a person who has been defamed and responds with a
"counterattack" against the defaming party.102 The courts, however, are
cautious in accepting this defense and have set two conditions for it to
apply. First, the defense is applicable only if the counterattack was
conducted without malice, out of the sincere belief that the facts attributed
to the defaming party are true.103 This condition is not met in our example,

100

The standard of liability under defamation law varies across states. Most states impose
liability where a private person was defamed with malice or negligence. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977) ("One who publishes a false and defamatory
communication concerning a private person... is subject to liability, if, but only if, he (a)
knows that the statement is false and that it defames the other, (b) acts in reckless disregard
of these matters, or (c) acts negligently in failing to ascertain them."). In our example,
Plaintiff might be at least negligent and, therefore, possibly liable. The fact that she is a
reporter is relevant to the application of the negligence standard (id. cmt. g). A different
standard, requiring actual malice, is generally applied only in cases of defamation of public
officials or public figures (and sometimes when the matter involved was of public or general
concern). See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278-80 (1964) (establishing
the "actual malice" standard for public officials); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A.
101
In other cases of self-defense, third parties might be injured, but this is mere coincidence.
With self-defense lies, however, the effect on third parties is in fact the aim of the defensive
lie.
102
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 594 cmt. k (1977) ("Defense against defamation: A
conditional privilege exists under the rule stated in this Section when the person making the
publication reasonably believes that his interest in his own reputation has been unlawfully
invaded by another person and that the defamatory matter that he publishes about the other
is reasonably necessary to defend himself. The privilege here is analogous to that of selfdefense against battery, assault or false imprisonment... Thus the defendant may publish in
an appropriate manner anything that he reasonably believes to be necessary to defend his
own reputation against the defamation of another, including the statement that his accuser is
an unmitigated liar.").
103
See Dickins v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 171 F.2d 21, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (holding that as
result of plaintiff's defamatory statements, defendant had the "legal right to publish a reply
which, even if it were false, was privileged unless the plaintiff proved the defendant knew it
to be false or otherwise proved actual malice in the publication"); Novecon Ltd. v.
Bulgarian-American Enter. Fund, 190 F.3d 556, 566 (D.C. App. 1999) (recognizing the selfdefense privilege, which constitutes a complete defense to a claim of libel or defamation,
but only in the absence of malice). Some courts would allow the claim of self-defense only
as a partial defense that enables a reduction of damages but does not bar recovery altogether.
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since Defendant intentionally conveyed false information about Plaintiff to
the public—in other words, lied to the public. Second, the counterattack
should relate to the facts constituting the defamatory statements and not
other, unrelated facts.104 At best, it is only questionable whether this
condition is met in Example 5: on the one hand, Defendant's lie was
intended to undermine the credibility of Plaintiff's defamatory statement,
but, on the other hand, the lie also challenged Plaintiff's integrity, by
presenting her as an unreliable and even corrupt journalist.105
We maintain that in certain circumstances, defensive lies like the lie
told by Defendant in Example 5 should be permitted, albeit with
considerable restraint. First, as with truth extracting-information lies,
permitting lies that undermine false information runs the risk of blurring
the line between permissible lies and prohibited lies. Furthermore,
allowing lies in this type of case would encourage the dissemination of
false information by interested parties and thereby externalize costs to the
public, which might believe the false information. Certainly, Defendant's
lie in Example 5 undermined the credibility of another lie, Plaintiff's lie,
and that, in itself, is a virtue. At the same time, however, assuming Plaintiff
acted in good faith, when Defendant disseminated false information also
with regard to her credibility, he was misleading the public about Plaintiff's
integrity in general. And lastly, allowing lies in situations represented by
Example 5 could over-deter journalists or others from publishing valuable
information in their possession. Thus, allowing defensive lies would
obstruct free speech, to the public's detriment, and might even be
unconstitutional.
These compelling objections to allowing defensive lies in cases
illustrated by Example 5 all lead to the conclusion that they should be
tolerated only in extreme situations, when the following conditions are met:

See Fleming v. Kane County, 636 F. Supp. 742, 749 (D.C. N. Dist. Ill. 1986) ("As Illinois
law makes clear, however, proof of provocation would not bar recovery here—it would
simply enter into the calculation of damages.").
104
See Guenther v. Ridgway Co., 187 A.D. 593, 596 (N.Y. 1919) ("It is well settled that
where a person is attacked in a newspaper he has the right to reply, and put his side of the
controversy before the public. In this article Rice did not attempt to defend himself from
the charges made against him, but made a counter attack in which libelous charges were
made against the plaintiff not pertinent to the matters charged in the attack. Where this is
done the replying party has exceeded his privilege, and it affords him no protection.").
105
Some courts have been more flexible in allowing the "self-defense" privilege. See, e.g.,
Collier v. Postum Cereal Co., 150 A.D. 169, 178 (N.Y 1912) ("It is a contradiction in terms
to say that the one attacked is privileged only to speak the truth and not to make a counter
attack, or that legitimate self-defense consists only in a denial of the charge or a statement of
what is claimed to be the truth respecting its subject-matter. One in self-defense is not
confined to parrying the thrusts of his assailant. Of course, the counter attack must not be
unrelated to the charge, but surely the motives of the one making it are pertinent.");
Mencher v. Chesley, 193 Misc. 829, 831 (N.Y 1948) ("Legitimate self-defense is not limited
to a mere denial of the charge, but it may include a proper counterattack in the forum
selected by the plaintiff."); Korndorffer v. Autumn Hills Convalescent Ctrs., 1994 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2359, 18 (Tex. App. 1994) (same).
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(1) the defamer lied and had no intention of exposing the truth; (2) the
defensive lie told was the least-drastic lie that could effectively undermine
the credibility of the defamatory statement; and (3) there was an urgent
need to discredit the defamatory statement, and other legal means would
not be effective. We propose that the person who disseminated the
defensive lie should bear the burden of proving that all three conditions
have been satisfied. The first condition is of utmost importance, and it
imposes strict liability on the defensive liar: if it emerges that the defamer
acted in good faith, the defensive liar will be precluded from claiming selfdefense and will be liable for any harm suffered by the defamer.106
B. Dilution of the Truth-Signal
1. Extracting Information
With truth-revealing lies, like other categories of lies, there is a risk
that permitting such lies will lead to difficulties in distinguishing truthtellers from liars. This could adversely impact both truth-tellers and the
parties to whom they convey information.
But is this risk a true concern in this category of cases? Arguably, if in
situations like Example 4 (Lying to a Suspect), police were permitted to lie
in interrogations to elicit the truth, suspects would never trust any police
interrogator, liars and truth-tellers alike. Consequently, truth-telling police
interrogators would often be frustrated in their interrogations because
suspects would refuse to believe that the information shown to them is not
false.107 Yet it is our view that this concern is not significant, since if the
law were to permit lying to interrogated suspects, the police would balance
the costs and benefits of this practice and set its interrogation policy
accordingly. As a repeat player, the police would realize that a truth-telling
reputation will better serve its goals and, accordingly, prohibit its
interrogators from lying to suspects and even publicize this policy.
Alternatively, the police could allow interrogators to lie, but create an
effective enough smokescreen to lead suspects to believe that all
interrogators are truth-tellers. If this tactic is successful, the truth-signal of
truth-telling interrogators will not be significantly diluted, even if
interrogators are permitted to lie from time to time.108
This analysis also holds in the context of lies told by prosecutors to
witnesses being cross-examined: if prosecutors were permitted by the law

106

With criminal liability, the law should probably be more constrained and require a
certain degree of malice on the part of the defensive liar.
107
See Young, supra note 84, at 476 ("[A] close look at how police investigate demonstrates
that police lying can impede evidence gathering by generating distrust and suspicion which
limit citizen cooperation.").
108
If it were clear that the best strategy is not to lie, making lying illegal would help the
police to convey that they don't lie.
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to tell such lie, the prosecution would decide whether the costs of lying
exceed its benefits and shape policy accordingly. With both prosecutorial
lies and police interrogation lies, the public authority that decides whether
or not to allow lying is the entity that internalizes the costs and benefits of
lying—including the dilution of the truth-signal—and it makes its decision
in accordance with that cost-benefit analysis.
There would be a different outcome with lies told by one-shot players,
such as defense lawyers. They could have a socially excessive inclination
to lie in cross-examining witnesses, since others bear the costs of the
dilution of the truth-signal. Arguably, for this reason, only prosecutors
should be allowed to lie in cross-examining witnesses. This, however,
would give them a relative advantage over other litigants, which, in itself,
would generally be seen as undesirable,109 perhaps explaining the absolute
prohibition on lying in court.110
2. Undermining the Credibility of False Information
In Example 5 (Countering Defamation), allowing defensive lies would
dilute the truth-signal in two manners. First, there is the risk that at some
point in the future, when Plaintiff is telling the truth, the public would be
distrustful of her statements since her credibility has been shaken by
Defendant's defensive lie. This risk is not of great concern so long as
defensive lies are allowed in only narrow circumstances, as we have
proposed. Thus, under our proposal, even if Plaintiff was not hired by
Defendant's adversaries, her journalistic integrity should rightly be
questioned in the future. Defendant's defensive lie would therefore impact
her credibility in the right direction (even if for the wrong reason).
Second, people who defend themselves against defamatory statements
without lying would also lose credibility: the public would doubt their
truthfulness, knowing that they could be lying. This concern, albeit real,
should not be overstated. Under our proposal, the defensive liar takes a risk
that if the defamer acted in good faith, the defensive liar will be liable for
defaming the defamer. Therefore, when the public—or those people to
whom the defensive lie was conveyed—must decide whether a person who
was defamed and defended himself lied, they will know that he has
something to lose if he did tell a defensive lie and the defamer acted in
good faith.
C. Effectiveness and Costs of Defense
Would truth-revealing lies be effective in attaining the goal they are

109

See Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat, Asymmetries and Incentives in Plea Bargaining and
Evidence Production, 122 YALE L.J. 690 (identifying, explaining, and criticizing
asymmetries between the prosecution and defendants created by criminal procedure law).
110
For further explanation, see infra Part III.C.
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intended for? When such lies are told to extract information the answer
seems to be yes: interrogators and attorneys can use this tactic effectively
to extract information from the deceived parties. Furthermore, these lies
would not really burden the deceived parties with any costs of verification:
suspects interrogated by the police and witnesses cross-examined in court
who are withholding information essential to the administration of justice
would bear no extra costs of social value if they are lied to.
There might be, however, a difference between the effectiveness of
such lies in civil litigation and in criminal litigation. William Stuntz offered
an innovative explanation for why police deception in criminal cases is
allowed but deception in civil cases is not.111 According to Stuntz,
deceptive tactics contribute substantively to evidence-gathering in criminal
investigations, for much of the essential information in these cases tends to
be private, and witnesses are often unreliable or unwilling to testify. The
police can obtain key pieces of information by using deceptive tactics,
which are particularly effective in the first stage of an investigation. At this
point a defense lawyer is unlikely to be involved yet, so there is a much
lower risk that costly precautions will be taken by the suspect to avoid
being trapped by the police. The process is quite different in civil cases:
there are usually lawyers representing both sides from the very outset, who
take precautions that dramatically reduce the effectiveness of deceptive
tactics.112 In sum, whereas lies are effective in exposing the truth in the
early stages of criminal cases, they are likely to trigger costly precaution
measures and be ineffective in civil cases.113
Stuntz's argument can be easily applied to justify a distinction between
lies told in court—whether in criminal or civil litigation—and lies told in
police interrogations. In either a civil or criminal trial, the chances of
attorneys being involved are far higher than in police interrogations, and
therefore lies in the former context would be far less effective than in the
latter. Similarly, the costs of defense against lies would be higher in the
context of court proceedings than in police interrogations. Still, there is one
qualification to be made: as we have suggested, short-lasting lies in crossexamination should be allowed.114 Such lies can be expected to be
effective, since the attorney for the opposing side has only limited ability to
defend" the interrogated witness against the effect of the cross-examining
attorney's lies—far more so than in the other stages of the litigation, be it
111

William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903
(1993) (analyzing the doctrines that allow deceptive evidence-gathering in criminal cases
and explaining why they are not applied in civil cases).
112
If the anti-deception rules in civil litigation are abolished, incentives to hire lawyer by all
parties will be very high. For more on this argument, see Stuntz, supra note 128, at 1919.
113
Moreover, the costs of precautions mostly fall on repeat players, who, in criminal cases,
are often professional criminals. Therefore, such costs might often be deemed a social gain
rather than social costs, which strengthens the argument. See Stuntz, supra note 128, at
1928.
114
Supra text accompanying note 94.
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civil or criminal.
The effectiveness and costs analysis is more complex with regard to
lies aimed at undermining the credibility of false information. Some
defensive lies might fail to achieve their purpose if they are successfully
refuted. But such refutation is not cost-free. If there is a high likelihood of
refutation in most cases, it might be more desirable for the law to prohibit
defensive lies outright and save the wasteful refutation costs.
IV. PATERNALISTIC LIES
The fourth and final category of cases is comprised of instances of
paternalistic lying, namely, lies that are aimed at benefiting the party being
deceived. We discuss here two subcategories of paternalistic lying: In the
first, the lie is intended to improve the deceived person's well-being and
does not impact his behavior. We call these "mere paternalistic lies." In the
second context of paternalistic lying, the aim is also to improve the wellbeing of the deceived person but by influencing his behavior. We call these
lies "manipulative paternalistic lies." While the law has demonstrated a
certain extent of tolerance toward mere paternalistic lies, it is generally
intolerant toward the manipulative form.
A. The Prima-Facie Case and the Law
1. Mere Paternalistic Lies
The following example illustrates a typical case of a mere paternalistic
lie:
Example 6. The Terminally Ill Patient. Doctor realizes that Patient
is going to die within a few days and conveys this sad information
to Patient's family. Patient asks Doctor what his chances of
survival are, and Doctor answers that his chances are good. Did
Doctor commit a tort or violate medical ethics?115
Most courts allow and even require doctors to limit disclosure in
situations where full disclosure of the risks involved in a treatment to an
apprehensive patient might adversely affect that patient's condition, cause
psychological damage, or jeopardize the success of the treatment.116 In
115

See Arato v. Avedon, 5 Cal. 4th 1172 (Cal. 1993). In this case, doctors did not disclose
the pancreatic cancer patient's very low statistical life expectancy. The patient underwent
treatment and died one year later. The court ruled that disclosure of life expectancy in this
case had not been mandatory. Note, however, that in this case, unlike in our example, the
doctors did not lie but merely avoided disclosure, and the patient's early death was only
statistically anticipated.
116
Allan H. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549,
597 (arguing that when a patient is likely to have a severe reaction to disclosure of his or her
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several jurisdictions, this approach is supported by statutory law.117
Accordingly, some courts will allow a doctor not to inform a terminally ill
patient of her exact statistical life expectancy, when it might strip her of
any hope.118 Lies, however, are not permitted in the same context: if a
patient asks his doctor outright about her exact medical condition, the
doctor is forbidden to lie.119 Borderline cases are possible, however. First,
there are cases in which it is unclear whether the terminally ill patient who
asks the doctor about her medical condition really wants to know the truth.
We believe that a doctor who lies when it is reasonable to assume that the
patient, even if she asked for the truth, did not truly want to know the truth
should be exonerated from liability, as long as the lie was intended to spare
the patient sorrow and despair. In order to reasonably determine what the
patient really wanted to know, the doctor should consult with the patient's
closest family, assuming they are available.
Second, and more importantly, when lies could, with high probability,
have a therapeutic effect, they should be more broadly tolerated. It has been
well-established by scientific research that sorrow and despair can
adversely affect a patient's physical, and not only emotional, condition.120
In such circumstances, therefore, the general rule should be that doctors are
allowed to lie to their patients, unless the patient indicated a clear
preference to the contrary before she was diagnosed with a serious
condition. Indeed, doctors occasionally request their patients to state in
advance whether they want to be fully informed about their medical
condition.121
2. Manipulative Paternalistic Lies
Consider the following example:
Example 7: A Blood Transfusion. Patient is injured in a road
accident and urgently requires a blood transfusion. However, she
refuses the procedure for religious reasons. Doctor lies to Patient
condition, full disclosure might be deemed wrongful); Woolley v. Henderson, 418 A.2d
1123, 1130 (Me. 1980) (when disclosure of possible risks may have such an adverse effect
on the patient as to jeopardize therapy's success, full disclosure could constitute bad medical
practice).
117
See, e.g., NY CLS Pub Health § 2805-d(4).
118
See, e.g., Arato , 5 Cal. 4th at 1177.
119
See, e.g., Willis v. Bender, 596 F.3d 1244, 1259-60 (10th Cir. 2010) ("requiring
physicians to honestly answer a patient's questions is a bright-line rule not subject to
conflicting interpretations").
120
Elad Neeman, Oded Zmora & Shamgar Ben-Eliyahu, A New Approach to Reducing
Postsurgical Cancer Recurrence: Perioperative Targeting of Catecholamines and
Prostaglandins, 18(18) CLIN. CANCER RES. 4895 (2012) (arguing that a patient's
psychological condition could affect long-term cancer recurrence).
121
See, e.g., Arato v. Avedon, 5 Cal. 4th 1172, 1176 (Cal. 1993) (patient filled out a
questionnaire routinely given to new patients, which asked, among many other questions,
whether he wished to be told the truth about his condition).
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by saying that she will be given only liquid intravenously and not
blood, and Patient agrees to this. Did Doctor commit a tort or
violate medical ethics?
Under the informed consent doctrine, doctors are obliged to disclose
full and honest information to patients before administering any treatment
to them.122 The extent of the disclosure required is determined mostly by an
objective materiality standard, referring to the information that a reasonable
patient would want to consider in deciding whether to undergo the
treatment.123 The prevailing view is that a doctor who failed to disclose
relevant information about the treatment will be liable for negligence if
harm is done, and a doctor who administered a different treatment from
what the patient consented to will be liable for battery. 124 Although courts
might admit some limits on disclosure where the disclosure itself would
have harmed the patient's condition, they do not accept a paternalistic
reasoning for non-disclosure, when the doctor feared that the patient would
make an unwise or irrational decision if she were to receive full
information.125 Needless to say, straightforward lies—as in Example 7—are
prohibited outright.126 Thus, prevailing law would likely hold Doctor in
Example 7 liable for battery. But should that be the law?
To fully understand the problem, we should consider first the
alternatives available to Doctor in Example 7. In most jurisdictions, in
extreme situations where a patient refuses a life-saving treatment for nonmedical reasons, the doctor can apply to the court to decide whether
treatment should be forced on the non-cooperative patient. Some courts
will order forced treatment on the theory that doctors cannot be compelled
to disregard their professional standards and the dictates of their conscience
by providing poor treatment that will result in a patient's death,127 and some
122

In emergencies, when getting patients' informed consent is impractical, doctors are free
to administer treatment immediately, even without the patient's consent. See, e.g., New York
Public Health Law § 2805-d(2); Woods v. Brumlop, 377 P.2d 520, 525 (N.M. 1962) ("An
exception to the rule requiring a disclosure of the dangers of a treatment procedure, of
course, is an actual emergency where the patient is in no condition to determine for
himself."). In these situations, and for this purpose, a doctor may even use physical force,
see, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 35.10(5).
123
DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 655 )2000) (explaining the older medical standard of
disclosure and the newer materiality standard of disclosure).
124
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 239 (Cal. 1972) (setting the boundaries between
negligence and battery claims in cases of medical non-disclosure).
125
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (Columbia Cir. 1972) (rejecting the
paternalistic argument as a defense for non-disclosure); Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d
98, 103 (Ind. 1992) (same).
126
Willis v. Bender, supra note 119, at 1260 ("In any event, one would be hard pressed to
argue that a reasonable physician of like training would lie to a patient in obtaining
consent.").
127
United States v. George, 239 F. Supp. 752, 754 (Dis. Conn. 1965) (ordering the
administration of blood transfusions to a Jehovah's Witness , because doctors and hospitals
cannot be forced to give bad medical treatment in the name of patient's right to free exercise
of religion).
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courts support this view on the basis of the state’s legitimate interest in the
preservation of life.128 Other courts, however, will hold that patient's
autonomy supersedes any other consideration129 and that a patient's consent
is a precondition to treatment even when refusal to undergo the treatment
seems unwise or irrational and will result in his or her death.130 Yet other
courts will consider a patient's decision to refuse life-saving treatment as a
decision to commit suicide, which could justify forced medical
intervention,131 possibly even without prior court approval.132
No court, however, will permit a doctor to lie to a patient about his or
her condition: once a patient has asked a direct question, the doctor is
required to answer honestly.133 We argue that this rule should be
reconsidered, at least in some jurisdictions.
Let us begin with jurisdictions that regard refusing life-saving
treatments as attempted suicide. Under this rule, doctors are allowed to
force patients to receive treatment, even without prior court approval.
Given this rule, it is not clear why doctors should not be allowed to lie to
patients when without lying, forcing treatment would be impossible, much
harder, or more damaging to the patient. If in any event, doctors are
permitted to administer treatment even against a patient’s will, it is not
clear why they should be obligated by law to provide patients with a
truthful explanation about the nature of the procedure.
The same argument can be made with regard to those jurisdictions that
require prior courts approval for forced treatment but, in emergency
128

John F. Kennedy Mem'l Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 582 (1971) (ordering the
administration of blood transfusions to a Jehovah's Witness, because the state, as well as the
hospital and its staff, has a legitimate interest in preserving lives, which warrants treatment).
129
Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 409 Mass. 116, 127 (1991) (holding that the right of a
Jehovah's Witness not to receive a blood transfusion supersedes the interest of the hospital
and state in preserving lives and that allowing her to make this decision does not undermine
the ethical integrity of the medical profession).
130
Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 383 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). In this case, an
elderly patient who suffered from gangrene refused amputation, even though this decision
would lead to her imminent death. The court ruled that the patient is legally competent, and
therefore the law protects her right to make even such a seemingly irrational decision.
131
Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008
(Colum. Cir. 1964) (ordering the administration of a blood transfusion to a Jehovah's
Witness and suggesting that prevention of suicide could be a relevant argument in states
where attempted suicide is illegal). This view has been rejected by other courts, see, e.g.,
Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 75 N.Y.2d 218, 227 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990) (noting that a Jehovah's
Witness's refusal to receive a blood transfusion is not considered a suicidal act justifying
intervention).
132
See, e.g., N.Y. Penal Law § 35.10(4) (2013) ("A person acting under a reasonable belief
that another person is about to commit suicide or to inflict serious physical injury upon
himself may use physical force upon such person to the extent that he reasonably believes it
necessary to thwart such result.").
133
Supra note 119. Also, if the doctor explicitly promised the patient that such a procedure
will not be performed, courts will also consider this as a breach of contract, see Nicoleau v.
Brookhaven Memorial Hosp. Ctr., 201 A.D.2d 544, 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (accepting
the patient's breach of contract claim against the doctor, who had administered blood
transfusions to the patient after explicitly promising not to do so).
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situations, allow court approval to be applied for retroactively.134 If courts
allow doctors to administer forced treatment, there seems to be no reason
for them to prohibit doctors from lying to patients when this would make
treatment easier and safer for the patient. Thus, in any circumstances in
which forced treatment is allowed by the law and lying to the patient is
likely to increase the chances of the treatment's success and better serve his
or her medical interests, lying should be tolerated by the law.
B. Dilution of the Truth-Signal
1. Mere Paternalistic Lies
If doctors are allowed to lie to patients in order to spare them sorrow
and despair or to improve their chances of recovery, doctors may find it
more difficult to convey true information to patients whose chances of
recovery are high. Thus, a patient who has been diagnosed with cancer with
high chances of recovery might suspect that his doctor is lying when she
gives him this information. This patient would be better off knowing with
certainty that his chances of recovery are high, as the doctor informed him.
Allowing mere paternalistic lies could, indeed, dilute doctors' truthsignal. Yet we believe that the risks will be diminished if such lies are
allowed in special cases only: namely, when the patient can be assumed to
prefer not to know the truth about her condition (even if she has requested
this information)135 and when a patient's chances of recovery will be
harmed if she knows the truth about her condition.136
2. Manipulative Paternalistic Lies
With manipulative paternalistic lies, there will be no meaningful
dilution of the truth-signal so long as the law permits these lies solely in
exceptional situations in which it is clear that the patient is behaving
extremely irrationally. Therefore, the majority of patients, who do not
behave extremely irrationally, would not be affected by this rule. The costs
of allowing manipulative paternalistic lies would be borne mostly by those
same extremely irrational patients who would be manipulated by their
doctor's lie and undergo medical treatment they are resisting. These costs,
however, should be disregarded, since the goal of permitting these lies, to
begin with, is to create precisely these costs, which, from a social
perspective, are in fact benefits.

134

Supra note 122.
Supra text following note 119.
136
Supra text accompanying notes 120-121.
135

VALUABLE LIES

47

C. Effectiveness and Costs of Defense
Would paternalistic lies be effective in attaining their goals? In other
words, would the lied-to parties be misled by the lies or detect them? We
believe that paternalistic lies, especially in the medical field, would often
succeed in going undetected. The simple reason is that at least in the cases
represented by Examples 6 (The Terminally Ill Patient) and 7 (A Blood
Transfusion), the patients are one-shot players, with no expertise in
detecting lies in the very unordinary situation they are in. Even if some
patients would suspect that they are being misled by their doctors, others
would believe their doctors; and while the latter group of patients would
benefit from the lie, the former group would bear only minimal costs.137
Furthermore, in some cases, there would be patients who would prefer to
be deceived—those who ask but do not really want to know138—and they
would probably not put much effort into detecting lies.
CONCLUSION
Lies are generally harmful. The goal of this article was to identify
those categories of cases where lies are socially valuable and should be
permitted, perhaps even encouraged, by the law.
Productive information lies are essential for generating valuable
information. In cases where such lies should be permitted under our theory,
the deceived party is actually prevented from benefiting from the liar's
efforts to acquire the productive information. Allowing one party to profit
from productive information acquired by another party without adequate
payment is tantamount to allowing the former to be unjustly enriched at the
expense of the latter. Note that permitting such lies neither worsens nor
improves the position of the deceived party relative to where he would
have been had the liar not searched for the productive information in the
first place.
Anti-abuse lies prevent the deceived party from abusing the liar or
third parties. Anti-abuse lies are directed at potential infringers of the rights
of the liar or others, and this is what makes them socially valuable. Along
the way, however, the same anti-abuse lies might adversely affect innocent
third-parties, a risk that must be taken into account in considering whether
to recognize the legitimacy of such lies.
Truth-revealing lies contribute to the elicitation of the truth. This
might sound paradoxical, since it implies that an untruth generates the
truth. Therefore, to make the argument to permit such lies reasonable,

137

A counterargument is that at least with Jehovah's Witnesses, if doctors are allowed to lie
to them, many would avoid coming to hospitals where they know they would be deceived.
This concern arises, however, even if lying is prohibited but doctors are allowed, with or
without court's approval, to forcibly administer blood transfusions.
138
Supra text following note 119.
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truth-revealing lies can be allowed only if they are short-lived or capable of
refuting other, much more severe lies. With this category of cases, as well,
the central risk to allowing lying is the potential adverse effects on third
parties. Therefore, these lies should be only narrowly allowed and with
clear boundaries.
Paternalistic lies arise mainly in medical contexts. While they might
serve patients' interests, they could be considered an infringement on their
autonomy. Sometimes, however, in exceptional cases, the benefits far
exceed the costs—in some instances, they are even lifesaving—and any
legal system should allow them in such circumstances.
We realize that permitting lying almost always dilutes the truth-signal.
Furthermore, deceived parties might find ways to detect the lies and
frustrate their intended goals. Certainly, these are all important
considerations and concerns, and as we have demonstrated throughout the
article, it does not suffice to show that a certain type of lies has social
value. Rather, it is necessary to also ensure that permitting lying in the
particular situation or context can be expected to be effective and that the
costs—especially the dilution of the truth-signal—will not exceed the
benefits. Indeed, in all four categories of cases identified in this article,
lies—within the boundaries we have drawn—should be permitted and
sometimes even encouraged.
In the table below, we summarize our analysis of the four categories
of valuable lies, according to the criteria applied in the article.
Table: Valuable Lies

I. Productive Information

Prima
Facie
yes

Dilution of the
Truth-Signal
only
for
nonprofessional
buyers, in limited
circumstances

II. Anti-Abuse Lies
A. Discrimination

yes

Effectiveness
yes

B. Self-Incrimination
C. Free-Riding
III. Truth-Revealing Lies
A. Extracting Information

yes
yes

yes, but in a
socially desirable
way
yes
sometimes

yes

sometimes

B. Undermining the
Credibility of
False Information
IV. Paternalistic Lies
A. Mere Paternalistic Lies
B. Manipulative
Paternalistic Lies

yes

sometimes

yes, especially in
police
interrogations
yes

yes
yes

mostly no
mostly no

mostly yes
mostly yes

yes
yes
sometimes
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The categories of lies we have analyzed do not exhaust all types of
lies, but they do represent those categories that we consider to be of special
significance. Specifically, there are many lies that should not be punished
by the law, not because of their social value, but due to the concern that
penalizing these lies—even if they lack social value—adversely impacts
desirable values and conduct. In this vein, the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a statute making false claim of receipt of a Medal of
Honor a crime not because such a claim has any social value, but in order
to protect First Amendment rights.139 Similarly, a merchant's puffing140 or
lies told in relation to contractual parties' reservation price141 are not
necessarily valuable, but because it is difficult to distinguish them from
truthful statements, penalizing them might have undesirable chilling effects
on parties negotiating contracts.
We have opened this article with the argument that in many instances,
the law should either impose a duty of disclosure coupled with a
prohibition on lying or else allow parties to withhold information from
other parties and lie about its contents. At the close of the article, we can
conclude that in many circumstances, the law rightly allows non-disclosure
but fails to complement this with permission to lie. This failing should be
corrected. Courts and legislatures should acknowledge that lying is not
always bad. The discussion of the categories of lies that we have focused
on here could give pause to consider whether the almost general prohibition
on lying, even when the lie adversely affects others, should be abandoned.

139

United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012). The respondent falsely claimed
that he had been awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor and was accused of violating
the Stolen Valor Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 704(b). The Supreme Court held that the Act was in
violation of the First Amendment and therefore unconstitutional.
140
See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 163
(Tex. 1995) (holding that manager’s statements that the building for sale was "superb,"
"super fine," and "one of the finest little properties in the city" were "puffing" or opinion
rather than misrepresentation of fact); Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1172 (2d. Cir. 1994)
("statements will not form the basis of a fraud claim when they are mere 'puffery' or are
opinions as to future events"); Miller’s Bottled Gas, Inc. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 955 F.2d
1043, 1051 (6th Cir. 1992), ("[m]ere 'sales talk' and 'puffing' do not rise to the level of
fraud").
141
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 2 (2013) (permitting lawyers to
engage in certain forms of misrepresentation regarding "estimates of price or value placed
on the subject of a transaction"); Russell Korobkin et al., The Law of Bargaining, 87 MARQ.
L. REV. 839, 840 (2004) ("It is universally recognized that a negotiator's false statements
concerning how valuable an agreement is to her or the maximum she is willing to give up or
exchange in order to seal an agreement (the negotiator's 'reservation point,' or 'bottom line')
are not actionable, again on the ground that such false statements are common and no
reasonable negotiator would rely upon them."); Scott R. Peppet, Can Saints Negotiate? A
Brief Introduction to the Problems of Perfect Ethics in Bargaining, 7 HARV. NEGOTIATION
L. REV. 83, 92 (2002) ("it is acceptable for a lawyer to misrepresent a client's reservation
price").
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